2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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Foreword

Now at last Hickinbotham occupied a position in which the 114
scope of his responsibilities included the Aden Protectorate as 123
well as the Colony of Aden, for as Governor and Commander-in-Chief he was Governor of the Protectorate as well as
Governor of the Colony. It has been thought by some that the 648
term "Governor of the Aden Protectorate" is a misnomer, for 643
it is not the policy of the British Government to govern the Protectorate directly, but to leave the control of its internal affairs to the local Arab Rulers in treaty relations with Her Majesty's Government. Under these treaties the British Government are bound to give the Rulers protection against external attack, and through the Governor of Aden the Rulers also receive, when necessary, assistance in preserving internal
security and also advice and financial help. The Colony of [131]
Aden is a small, mainly urban, territory of about 75 square [133]
miles: the Protectorate is a largely mountainous and thinly [134]
populated area with comparatively small fertile cultivable parts
and is about the same size as the United Kingdom. The role of [161]
the Governor in the Protectorate thus differs fundamentally 643
from his position in the Colony, where he is the head of a direct administration, and the problems with which he has to deal in the two areas are very different.

The Arabs of the Protectorate tribes made a natural appeal 114
to Hickinbotham, as they have done to many other British [123]
officers and others whose work has brought them into contact with them and who can understand their outlook on life. In this book he has given a fascinating account of the Protectorate and its people based on practical sympathy and intimate knowledge, as well as an interesting description of Aden Colony and his experience in it in successive capacities. Sir Tom's position as Governor of the Aden Colony and Protectorate also necessitated his playing an active part in dealing with the question of British relations with the Yemen, the independent Arab Kingdom which lies to the north of the western part of the Protectorate, and his book includes informative chapters about this troublesome problem.

It is a pleasure to me to commend this work to all those 00
who seek reliable information about this part of the world and

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504 undeniable fact is that Aden's importance in the past, and important it was, was due as it is today to its magnificent harbour. Curiously enough the harbour was, in bygone days, on the east side of the peninsula in what are now known as Front Bay and Holkat Bay. It was not until the middle of the last century that the present harbour on the west side was surveyed and brought into use as Front Bay gradually silted up and Holkat Bay, never a safe anchorage, was abandoned.

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648 The prosperity and the wealth of Aden as a trading centre has always attracted the envious attention of the rulers of the Yemen be they Himyarites or Sabeans, as they were at the beginning of the Christian era, or Abyssinians, as they were five hundred years later when the Persians in their turn invaded that country, or Turks, as they have been twice during the last thousand years, or just plain Yemenis, as they are today. I do not propose at this stage to consider past and present relations between Aden and the Yemen; they will become apparent as my story unfolds.

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648 The Imams of the Yemen were not alone in their wish to control the destiny of Aden. The Portuguese were the first European nation who attempted to establish themselves in the town. This they did on Easter Day in 1513 when Don Alphonso d' Albuquerque, who had arrived from Goa the previous day with a fleet of twenty ships, landed over a thousand soldiers with scaling ladders to storm the fortifications. The attempt failed, and after a four-day siege, during which Don Alphonso's men succeeded only in capturing an outwork and some thirty or forty pieces of ordnance, the troops were withdrawn and after cannonading the town in a fit of temper Don Alphonso sailed away up the Red Sea.

Three years later the Mameluke Sultan of Egypt sent his Commander, Rais Suleiman, to take the town by assault, but the attempt failed. The fortifications of Aden were so damaged, however, that the Governor was prepared to surrender the place to the Portuguese when they appeared on the scene again later in the same year. They had other preoccupations at the time and refused the offer, only to find later when they again returned that the fortifications had been repaired and the

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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Governor in no mood to treat with them. The Portuguese had to wait nearly fifty years before the inhabitants of Aden, weary of Turkish rule, handed the town over to them. The Turks had captured Aden by treachery in 1538. They arrived in a fleet of ships and landed a number of sick men who were carried ashore and accommodated in the town. Then they invited the Governor to visit the flagship. He did so and was promptly seized and hung. At the same time the sick men in the town were miraculously restored to health, rose from their beds as able-bodied soldiers, and with little trouble the wily Turks were in control.

The Portuguese remained at Aden for a few months only, before being forced to surrender the town in 1551 to the Capidan of Egypt; in other words, the Turks were back in possession again and it was during this Turkish period of control that British ships first came on the Aden scene, when Captain Sharkey in the *Ascension*, a ship of the East India Company, paid a visit and was well received.

The Turks withdrew from Aden in the first half of the seventeenth century, and Aden was free from invasion from the sea for approximately two hundred years until, in fact, we came on the Aden scene again and Aden became what it still is today, a British possession.

By 1839 the greatness that had been Aden's had disappeared and Captain Haines of the Indian Navy, the leader of the expedition which secured the town for the British Crown and who was to become the first Resident, has left on record his first impression of the place:

> "The little village (formerly the great city) of Aden is now reduced to the most exigent condition of poverty and neglect. In the reign of Constantine this town possessed unrivalled celebrity for its impenetrable fortifications, its flourishing commerce, and the glorious haven it afforded to vessels from all quarters of the globe. How lamentable is the present contrast." [1]

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[1] Hunter's *Statistical Account of the British Settlement of Aden*, 1877, p. 169.

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133 passengers from ships) and Ma'alla are built on the northern
and western slopes of Jebel Shamsan, the highest peak of the
volcanic range of hills surrounding Crater. Jebel Shamsan is
quite a presentable hill, for it is just over 1,700 ft. in height
and was at one time adorned with a signal station.

361 The isthmus which joins Aden to the mainland is called
133 Khormaksar and is as flat as the proverbial pancake. During
132 the monsoon winds of summer it is a hellish place of drifting
508 sand and it is here that the Royal Air Force have their station;
707 the military and civil airport are also here. Close by the airport
are the houses of the more senior civil and military officials
361 and a few ordinary folk, who are, on the whole, much better
647 paid than the officials, but of course not nearly so important.
● 648 Originally there were only two rows of houses, one of brown
houses and the other of white houses, and since they were inhabited
mainly by officials, they were, not unnaturally, known
as Downing Street and Whitehall. Now there are rows and
rows of houses, all variations of the usual colonial box theme
in architecture, incredibly ugly but reasonably comfortable,
but I am glad to say Whitehall and Downing Street are still
the really fashionable roads.

361 At the northern and landward end of the isthmus there is the
351 town of Sheikh Othman with its pleasant gardens so well
known to many tourists. Sheikh Othman was also, until quite
recently, well known in a less desirable way to visitors and
residents alike, but in modern times morals seem to have
improved, and while the gardens have been enlarged, the other
361 attractions have been reduced. The town was not acquired by
648 any splendid feat of arms, but by a purely commercial trans-
175 action. It was bought from the Sultan of Lahej in 1882. Aden,
on the other hand, was invested in 1839 by an armed expedition
from India, carried in ships of the Indian Navy. The reason
for this expedition is said to have been to punish an outrage
which had occurred when the crew of an English ship wrecked
on the coast near Aden were maltreated. In point of fact the
probabilities are that the reason for our somewhat drastic
action was because we wished to control the only good
harbour between India and Egypt and use it as a coaling station

for our ships. As negotiations with the Lahej Sultan, who then 361
owned the Aden Peninsula, had broken down, the deadlock 648
was solved by force. The original owner of Little Aden was 175
the Akrabi Sheikh, a quite unimportant person whose minute 175
territory is surrounded on three sides by his infinitely larger and 648
more powerful neighbour Lahej. Whether or not the Akrabi 643
Sheikh was entitled to sell is a matter which has occupied the minds of the Sultans of Lahej from time to time even up to the present day, but sell the Sheikh did in 1888 and buy we did, and that for all practical purposes is that.

Aden has been safe from foreign aggressors since we ourselves 175
filled that role in 1839, except for a brief period during 648
the First World War when a part of what is now the Colony 726
was occupied by Turkish forces. This rather curious state of 721
affairs came about in this way: Lahej, the name usually given to the capital of the Sultanate of the same name, the premier of all the Protectorate States by virtue of the importance of that State combined with the fact that the Lahej Treaty was the first to be concluded in the year 1839, is only some 17 miles to the north of Sheikh Othman. In 1915 the Turkish wolf came down on the Aden fold by way of the donkey-cum-camel tracks from Taiz in the Yemen. The then Sultan of Lahej, a good friend of ours, marched against the common foe with what tribesmen he could rally to his banner and at the same time he very properly called on the General Officer Commanding the Aden Garrison for assistance. In Aden there was, of course, tremendous excitement as a column was hastily organised and assembled at Sheikh Othman. It was the most ill-fated column that ever set out; there were incredible delays at the start, with the result that the troops did not begin their advance until the sun was well up. It was the height of summer and the 17 miles across which they had to move on foot were sandy and devoid of practically all forms of cover. The water for the column was carried on camels; the camels ran away shortly after the start. Whether this was of their own volition or whether they were encouraged to do so by treacherous drivers is a matter of opinion, for no records of that disastrous march are known to exist. The troops continued their advance and they went on

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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over the hot sand, some of them to their death from heat exhaustion and thirst, but most of them did, in fact, arrive at the thin palm groves of the Lahej Oasis. Many more would have failed and died but for the European merchants of Aden, who, obtaining ice from the ice factories in the town, sent it out in Ford cars after the column. The cars stuck in the sand, but mercifully not all in the same place, so that many of those who failed to complete the march and turned back found ice to sustain them at intervals across the desert until once again they were able to reach Sheikh Othman. As I have said, the majority of the column did reach Lahej and with it was an officer of my acquaintance who was one of the only two members of the Garrison who had ever been there before this disastrous military adventure. One day, twenty years later, as he and I drove together to Lahej to a lunch party being given by the Sultan, he pointed to a small clump of thorn bushes under which, on that memorable day, he had crawled to escape from the heat of the sun, utterly exhausted. He told me that when he had partially recovered he thought to himself: "If I stay here I shall certainly be shot as a deserter. If I try and go on I may die, but on the other hand I may get there." So choosing the uncertainty in preference to the certainty he did go on and he reached Lahej.

Those of the column who did get through were hastily reorganised and were disposed to meet the advancing Turks. By one of those odd changes of climate which occur in the tropics it poured with rain that night and it was indeed a miserable remnant of the column that saw the sunrise the next day. At daylight the troops moved forward through the northern limits of the Oasis and out on to the plain that leads up to the foothills to make contact with the Sultan's force, which they knew to be engaged with the enemy. The Sultan himself came riding back to meet these British reinforcements and to inform them of the enemy's dispositions and of those of his own soldiers. He met them. It was the last thing he ever did. They shot him dead. They thought he was a Turk, and then, without coming to grips with the Turkish forces at all, they turned back whence they had come, back all the way to

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Aden. The Turks occupied Lahej as they had already occupied 648
the territories of the Haushabi Sultan and the Amir of Dhala, 726
two Protectorate rulers whom the British Government had 721
undertaken to defend. They advanced to Sheikh Othman and
they occupied the whole of the northern side of the harbour,
even the Little Aden headland.

I have never understood why the combatants never fired at each other across the harbour. Maybe the Turks had no guns, or if they had, they were not powerful enough, or perhaps the guns of the fortress could not be trained away from the sea like those of an even greater fortress in a later and greater war. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that neither side seems to have made any effort to interfere with the other.

When I first knew the Residency, as Government House 000
used to be called, there was mounted on the northern verandah overlooking the sea an enormous brass telescope beneath which a wooden table stood on which had been cut bearing lines on to the Turkish position on the north side of the harbour. The General Officer Commanding, who, at that time, was also the Resident, could thus with the least inconvenience to himself examine the enemy's position when he had finished his breakfast and before he applied his mind to greater things. The telescope still remains at Government House, though unfortunately the range table has disappeared.

The Turks remained in Sheikh Othman until eventually the 175
General, another General this time, bestirred himself and 648
marched against them; then they retreated to Lahej and they remained there until 1918 when Turkey was out of the war, and then they surrendered. Rude people say that the military authorities were induced finally to take belligerent action by the Committee of the Khormaksar Golf Club. The Golf Club's course, unfortunately, lay between the Turks and the British, and this was highly inconvenient to the members, so their representatives are said to have waited upon the General and pointed out that in the circumstances then prevailing golf was more exciting than comfortable. This tale may well be false and is certainly exaggerated, but there is no doubt whatsoever that there was a certain lack of initiative in the conduct of the

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648 military authorities throughout this episode in the history of the Colony.

643 In my early days in Aden, government was comparatively simple. The Resident, who was the senior civil official and *ex-officio* Commander-in-Chief, drove down to his office in Tawahi every morning from the Residency to deal with routine affairs and see anyone who cared to call on him. All were welcome, from the more senior departmental officers to the humblest of the humble of the subjects of His Majesty. Sir Bernard Reilly, who then held that position, had an amazing capacity for work and for play, and he succeeded in remaining outwardly completely unruffled even when dealing with important operations in the Protectorate which involved that much discussed topic, bombing, or when provoked by the Governments of both India and Bombay who invariably treated Aden as if it was a small town in the Bombay Presidency. Such was his conduct in public, but in private I have known him to express his views both freely and frankly.

645 In addition to the Resident there were four of us in the Secretariat, Gordon[1] of the Indian Political Service, who was the First Assistant Resident, Champion[2] of the Colonial Service, who was the Political Secretary, Lake,[3] the one and only Political Officer, and myself. I acted as Second Assistant Resident, in addition to my other duties at the Residency itself where I was a glorified A.D.C. Champion and Lake ran the Protectorate between them with the help of the head interpreter, Khan Bahadur Muhammed Salim Ali, an elderly gentleman with a Mongolian caste of countenance, who sat in a particularly small room under the stairs surrounded by papers, smoking a very bubbly water pipe, with his turban-like headdress on the back of his head or resting among the files, depending upon the heat of the room and his own degree of irritation. He had a remarkably hoarse voice and wore a pair of spectacles on the end of his nose, over which he peered at the crowd of Sheikhs, tribesmen and hangers-on, all wanting something and

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[1] Now Lt.-Colonel J. de la H. Gordon, C.S.I., C.I.E., O.B.E., M.C.

[2] Now Sir Reginald Champion, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

[3] Lt.-Colonel M. C. Lake, C.M.G. (dec.).

all talking at once, who squatted in what little space there was 645
inside the room and overflowed into the passage outside. The work these three men did was incredibly difficult and yet they were successful to a remarkable degree, and succeeded in maintaining not only security on the trade routes in the Protectorate, but at the same time they were able to strengthen the ties between Government and the Rulers.

Outside the Secretariat there were only three European officers of the Government. The senior was the Chairman of the Port Trust Board and of the Settlement Board, and at the time of which I am writing the appointment was held by an officer of the Royal Engineers who had been seconded to the civil engineering side of the Government of India. He presided over the Board of Trustees of the Port and was also the Chief Executive Officer, and in addition he managed the affairs of the Settlement. The Settlement, as I have already indicated, was a term which included all the British territory which is now the Colony, and the Settlement Board was the successor of what in fact had been a Municipal Committee. A munici- 632
pality was formed some while after our occupation of Aden in 1839, but it was not until 1882 that any attempt seems to have been made to produce a set of municipal rules. In 1900 the local authority ceased to be called a Municipal Committee and became known as the Aden Settlement. As such it, in fact, did everything, and rather more, that an ordinary municipality does in this country. The "rather more" being control of the [648] •
electric light supply and also the water supply, both profitable undertakings which were wrested from it when in 1937 Aden became a Crown Colony and the new Colonial Government was in search of funds.

The next important European officer was the Judicial Assist- 692
ant, who succeeded in combining with a reasonable degree of success the duties of legal adviser to the Resident and Judge of the District and Sessions Court. The last, but by no means 625
least important of the European officers, was the Commissioner of Police who was seconded from the Indian Police and under the District Magistrate was responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

693 whole reason, because there was a great deal in what he had said. In the early days certainly, there was a tendency for some of the less scrupulous legal practitioners not to attempt too seriously to dissuade their clients from going to court when they had no case.

000 Mackawwi now turned to the Protectorate, and said:

"You have not seen the Protectorate yet?"

"No," I replied.

"They are ignorant and poor people and something should be done for them," he said.

"What should be done?" I inquired. It was a question I was often to ask him and sometimes he did give me an answer, but more often than not the reply came,

"I do not know, but something should be done, something should be done before it is too late."

At this point the bell rang from the Resident's room and Mackawwi, unfolding his legs—he had been sitting with one thrown over the other—rose to his feet and with a particularly charming smile shook hands, and drifted through the door and away as if carried by the light breeze that blew that morning from the sea.

648 668 From the time that Aden was first acquired by us it formed part of the Bombay Presidency, but by 1932 political developments in India had reached a stage which made a break with Bombay inevitable. The Resident had been consulted, and it had been made clear to the authorities in India and London that the Arabs, who formed the majority of the population of the Settlement, would react most unfavourably to any suggestion that Aden should continue to be under the jurisdiction of the Bombay Government once provincial autonomy had become a fact in India. We took the view in Aden at that time that it would not be practicable for Aden to continue under control which had passed into the hands of the Indians themselves. Aden was not an Indian Colony, and over the years the Arabs had learnt one thing very clearly and that was not to expect generous treatment from India.

648 563 668 To understand the attitude of the Arabs to other races it must be realised that they consider themselves and always have,

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as superior to all people of colour and as equal in every way 563
with ourselves and the Americans. The other European races 668
fall, in their view, into a category somewhere between the Eastern and African races and the British, and it was therefore unthinkable that once the Aden Arabs had understood the implications of our policy in India that they would submit tamely to Indian domination. As Mackawwi said, they had been asleep for years, but now were beginning to stir and show signs of awakening.

In the spring of 1932, as Second Assistant Resident, I signed 642
the Government Notice informing the public that Aden had 648
been created a Chief Commissioner's Province under the direct control of the Government of India and was therefore no longer subordinate to the Government of Bombay. The issue of this very important Notice, which was in fact the first step on the road to internal self-government (though no-one recognised it as such at that time) caused little comment in Aden, except among the Parsees who viewed the transfer with disfavour. They had friends and relatives in Bombay and hoped that with the coming of Provincial autonomy to that Province they would have been able to play an even greater part in Aden affairs in the future than they had done in the past.

The practical effect of the change was that instead of the 648
Bombay Government making kind noises when some proposal for the improvement of the lot of the people of Aden was submitted to them and passing it on to the Government of India, with the strongest recommendations and a clear indication that they could not make the necessary finance available, the Government of India just said "No" at once. The result was precisely the same although indeed speedier and had the advantage that no false hopes were encouraged in the inexperienced.

The continued lack of sympathy on the part of the Govern- 648
ment of India during the years following the transfer from 668
Bombay could have but one result and that was to make the Arabs resent more and more the link between Aden and India. It had become a fetter to be shaken off as soon as possible. Mackawwi, and those who thought as he did, began to take

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668 more interest in political matters and their numbers began to increase rapidly. The advent of Provincial autonomy in India only added fuel to the fire of discontent and the thought that one day the Central Government in Delhi might follow, almost certainly would follow, the example of the Bombay and other Provincial Governments and that British officials in Aden might be replaced by Indians was intolerable. The Arabs became seriously alarmed and even the Hadhrami merchants paused in the counting of their profits to survey the scene. They did not like what they saw and they joined forces with Mackawwi and his friends who led a deputation to the Resident. The deputation asked that the Settlement of Aden should be treated in the same way as the Protectorate, which had been transferred to the control of the Colonial Office in London in 1928, and that in future they should come under the direct authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. They did not wait upon the Resident in any servile spirit, they came as the leaders of the people, and they came armed with their conditions. Aden was to remain a free port, no new taxation was to be imposed unless local circumstances made it essential and the judicial appeals were to continue to the High Court of Bombay.

The views of the Arabs were transmitted to London and New Delhi. Meanwhile the Arabs held meetings and the Parsees led the opposition and in turn held meetings. The meetings organised by the Parsees were well attended by the Arabs attracted, so uncharitable people said, by the refreshment that was provided by these well-to-do gentlemen.

As is customary when something is referred to London, nothing very much happened for some time, and the Arabs made the next move which took the form of a written memorandum embodying their views and their requests and the guarantees for which they had asked. This in turn was sent to London and New Delhi, and in consequence further negotiations followed which, from the Arab point of view, were
642 successful. Their request was granted and their conditions were
648 accepted and, in 1937, on April 1st, the Settlement of Aden became a Crown Colony under the direct control of the

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Colonial Office in London. Another fetter had been thrown 648
aside.

I must say a word here about that part of the guarantee 439
which ensured that Aden should remain a free port, for it is of the greatest importance. Aden was at that time, and I am glad to say still is, the great distributing centre for imports from the West and the East round the shores of Arabia and down the African coast. Cigarettes, piece-goods, provisions, machinery, sugar and grain all come to Aden in ocean-going vessels from all over the world and find their way by coastal steamers and country craft up and down the Red Sea and round the neighbouring coast. These steam coasters and country craft on their return voyages bring gums, hides and skins and coffee to Aden to be cleaned, sorted and graded, bagged or baled and exported
to Europe and the United States of America. Aden has main- 504
tained her position as a great *entrepôt* by virtue of four factors and they are, her geographical position, her natural harbour, her security and her freedom from import and export duties. Only an act of God could alter the configuration of Arabia or fill the harbour by some tempestuous upheaval beyond the control of man, and security will remain and be maintained
as long as Great Britain remains great. The only doubtful 651
factor at any time was freedom from customs duty, and the Arab leaders and their advisers in 1937 knew how essential it was to secure, in so far as they possibly could, this freedom as a preliminary to the transfer. None of us in Aden knew what the precise income of the new Colony would be and none of us knew what it was going to cost to run a Colony efficiently, especially a Colony which had been neglected for so long. What we did know was that the imposition of import or export duties, which might seem to be an obvious source of revenue, would in fact have a disastrous effect on the trade of the Colony. At the same time we were well aware that even British Government Departments have been known to be very short-sighted when pressed by the Treasury to find money to meet a deficit. Everyone expected that there would be a deficit if Aden was to have even half what she needed so badly—hence the insistence of the Arabs led by Mackawwi on this guarantee.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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000 Just two sentences, but very revealing. What business was it of mine; what indeed? It was precisely the answer I should have given myself if I had been asked by a stranger a similar question on any day when I was feeling a trifle irritable. Also it was the exact opposite of the type of answer I should have received from an Indian, and it was then that I began to realise that the Arabs were fundamentally different from the majority of Asiatics I had met up to that time.

632 My first real trip into the Protectorate came in 1932 when I
361 drove to Dhala, the capital of the Amirate of the same name.
Dhala, which continues to figure rather largely in the daily
Press in this country as the result of Yemeni incursions into the
area, is a small, rather uninteresting and rather sinister-looking
town of dirty grey houses which climb up the side of a hill.
[133] The Dhala plateau is about 4,500 ft. high and is surrounded by
• [648] hill features, the finest of which is Jebel Jihaf, a magnificent
massif 8,000 ft. high. The town is but a few miles from the
Yemen border and raiding by the Yemen was by no means
uncommon even in those days.

000 I stayed in the old castle which overlooks the town and crowns the hill, and well I remember having to leave the car and walk the last few hundred feet from where the road ended, up the steep footpath to the castle entrance. My luggage and that of my companion was unloaded by my servants, and the problem of carrying it up the hill was solved by a total stranger who called rather peremptorily to a half-dozen dreary passers-by, who I remember noticing had long side curls, not unlike the present-day Teddy boys. These dismal-looking fellows stopped without protest and at once seized the baggage and bore it off up the hill. When I reached the top myself and had exchanged preliminary courtesies with the Amir's representative, I inquired how much I should give the bearers, what amount would be a suitable reward for their labour. I was young and I had not been among the people of the Protectorate before and was, therefore, inexperienced in these matters. The Amir's representative looked surprised.

"Nothing," he said.

"But I must," said I.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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"No, no. There is no necessity, they are Jews," said he. 000

"But what has that got to do with it, they worked for me," I said.

"You do not understand. They are Jews," he said with a marked patience, as if talking to a child.

I argued no more but sent my servant with a small reward; whether it reached them or not I do not know.

There were then several thousand Jews living in the Protectorate 563 with a greater measure of security than they enjoyed in Central Europe. They were the artisans and the gold and silversmiths, and their houses were grouped together and generally slightly removed from the Arab quarters of the town. Every small town in the north-western area of the Protectorate had one of these Jewish quarters. They were not interfered with and they could and they did own land and they were useful to the Arabs and lived in peace with them. They were not involved in tribal disputes and it was considered something of a personal disgrace to kill a Jew. When they left some years later, drawn almost against ~~their~~ will by a force they could scarcely understand to Palestine, their need was felt and more than one Ruler tried to persuade them not to go. When they insisted on going they were not unreasonably treated by the Protectorate Rulers and were allowed to sell their land, unlike the Yemen where all the property of emigrating Jews became State property.

My next trip into the Protectorate was of a very different 000
character and came some two years later. I flew to Mukeiras
with the Resident and Portal,[1] then A.O.C. in Aden, and
Douglas Macfadyen,[2] then a Flight Lieutenant. Mukeiras was [632]
and still is the capital of the Audhali Plateau, and it was there [648]
that the Resident was to meet the young Audhali Sultan and
his uncle, the Regent, to receive their thanks for the efforts [728]
which he had made on their behalf during his negotiations with
the Yemen for the 1934 Treaty: this had resulted in the evacuation by the Zeidi forces of the whole of the Audhali Plateau as a prerequisite to the signature of the Treaty.

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[1] Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

[2] Air Marshal Sir Douglas Macfadyen, K.C.B., C.B.E., A.O.C.-in-C. Home Command R.A.F.

King Saud bin Abdul Aziz Ahl Saud of Saudi Arabia. This eastern frontier has never been demarcated, nor has it ever been in dispute, Her Majesty's Government and His Highness Saiyid Said bin Taimur, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, being in agreement on this, as on many other subjects. It is, of course, understood by both Governments that from time to time, and in particular if and when demarcation becomes necessary, there may have to be minor adjustments. His Highness has always been a wise and good neighbour and there is no doubt that should adjustments in the frontier line have to be made, then good sense will prevail and mutual agreement will not be difficult to achieve. I wish that the Rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen had proved such agreeable neighbours for then the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Governor of Aden would have had a much easier time of recent years.

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We come now to the most difficult frontiers, the western frontier separating the Protectorate from the Kingdom of the Yemen. In 1872 the Yemen had become, for the second time in the troubled history of that country, a part of the Ottoman Empire and was to remain a Turkish province until the end of the Great War of 1914–18. In 1902 it was decided by the British Government and the Sublime Porte that it was desirable to demarcate the frontier between the Turkish province of the Yemen and the territories of the Rulers in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government, in other words, the Aden Protectorate. One of the main reasons for this was to prevent border disputes which must always arise when a frontier has not been clearly defined on the ground and where the tribes under the authority of one country are at enmity with those under the authority of the other. Demarcation does not automatically stop these squabbles but it does make the determination of guilt easier and enables action to be taken quickly, always an essential, to punish the offenders. In that year the Anglo-Turkish Boundary Commission began their work at Sheikh Said in the extreme south-west corner of Arabia. The work was very difficult, not only because innumerable territorial tribal disputes had to be resolved, but also because of the mountainous nature of the country in which the Commission had to work. As they moved farther and farther into the interior in a north-easterly direction the mountains became more and more inaccessible, but by 1903 they had reached Dhala the capital of Amirate of the same name which had come into treaty relations with Her Majesty's Government in 1880. In 1904 the Boundary Commission was withdrawn, the demarcation having been completed only as far as a high point slightly north-north-east of the Yemen town of Qataba.

The decision to withdraw the Boundary Commission and abandon the further demarcation of the frontier was due in part to the difficulty of operating in the high mountains of Yafa which the Commission would have had to face next, and in part to the fact that as the Commission moved farther into the interior of Arabia the degree of effective control by the Turks and ourselves on our respective sides of the frontier became less and less. It was decided, therefore, by the two Governments that from there on they should define their respective spheres of influence by means of a line drawn on the map. A violet line; the colour is important, because the habit of drawing lines on a map is infectious, and we shall see when we come to the northern frontier of the Protectorate that more lines have been drawn on the map of Arabia, all of different colours.

The violet line started from the last point demarcated and was drawn at an angle of 45° up into the northern reaches of the Ruba-al-Khali. It then turned abruptly due north and ran up to the base of the Qatar Peninsula. Qatar, one of the rich oil-producing areas of the world, is a British Protected Sheikhdom jutting out into the Persian Gulf. The demarcated line and the violet line thus became the dividing line between the spheres of influence in Arabia of the British Empire and the Turkish Empire. The agreement was ratified by both Governments in 1914 as the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

There has been one very serious contravention of this frontier line and that was in the early nineteen-twenties, when the Imam of the Yemen overran the Rassasi Sultanate which lay on the Protectorate side of the violet line between the Protectorate States of the Audhali Sultan and the Sharif of

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Beihan. The Rassasi Sultan was not in treaty relation with the British Government. He had expressed a strong desire in 1914 when the Audhali Sultan entered into treaty relations with us, to do the same, but the Government of Bombay, after reference to the Government of India, who were careful of their money where Aden was concerned, was not prepared to find the hundred pounds or so a year which the Rassasi Sultan insisted upon as an annual gift. The Rassasi Sultans have never ceased to regret the failure of the negotiations. The present Ruler is a prisoner, if indeed he is still alive, in the State Prison in Sana, the ancient capital of the Yemen.

Lastly we come to the northern frontier line which joins the eastern and western frontiers across the Ruba-al-Khali. It is a simple matter to put it on the map. Just take a point on the blue line rather north of latitude 18° and draw a reasonably straight line (it is not quite straight at the beginning) eastward to join the eastern frontier at latitude 19°. It is all very easy to do now, but this simple line represents years of consultation and endless conferences. It had a number of predecessors and they were all of different colours, red, blue and black, some were ours and some were other peoples, but generally speaking they all represented a British reverse at the conference table. It was all very unfortunate and where we should have ended will, I am glad to say, never be known, for there occurred two fundamental changes. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, that astute and absolute Ruler of Saudi Arabia, that really great man, died, and the wastes of Arabia became peopled with oil prospectors.

By 1955 the oil search had been carried by the Americans, who operate the Dhahran concession in Saudi Arabia, right down into the southern reaches of the Ruba-al-Khali and the Iraq Petroleum Company, through their satellite Petroleum Concessions Limited, who hold the exploration concession for the Aden Protectorate, were engaged actively in their exploration work and were moving steadily northward. Something had to be done and it had to be done quickly. It was. Her Majesty's Government announced what was, in effect, the *de facto* northern frontier of the Protectorate, the present line I have described and at the same time it was indicated to those

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648 interested that trespassers would be dealt with in an appropriate manner; as indeed they were in 1955, as we shall see.

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221 This northern frontier follows very closely the territorial limits of the bedouin tribes, who are based on the Aden Protectorate, rather I should say, it follows the limits of their home grazing areas, for they are great travellers and wander far up into Saudi Arabia when scarcity of grazing forces them to take their herds of camels farther and farther afield; just as the Saudi Arabian tribes came south into the Protectorate when their own grazing has suffered from lack of rain. One often hears a lot of nonsense about being as free as the Arab of the desert. The Arab of the desert is no more free than the city worker who has to catch the 7.30 a.m., or whatever train it may be, to London, on five days of the week. The Arab must go where God has willed the rain to fall and the grass and other herbage to grow, otherwise he and his flock will die; he is not free to wander at will, he is bound, inexorably bound to follow the rain.

[133] Another advantage of this line is that it follows generally, but not exactly, the southern limits of the great sand dunes of the Ruba-al-Khali, dunes which are clearly defined and which rise in places to several hundred feet, almost one could say a natural frontier. Lastly, it is the limit of our effective control and although it is not ideal, it is practical and definite and not subject to yet another conference.

131 So much for the limits of the Protectorate, and now I must correct a misapprehension which seems to be fairly general with regard to its size. Many people in this country are under the impression that the Aden Protectorate is a small area approximating in size to that of one of the larger English counties; in fact, of course, it is nearly twenty-five per cent. larger than the whole of the United Kingdom including Northern Ireland.
133 In the west it is predominantly hilly, once the coastal plain is crossed, and the average height of the territory is some 3,500 ft., that is very nearly as high as Snowdon. The mountain ranges run east and west and are separated by plains and plateaus, each successive range being higher than the last until, on the line of Yafa and the Audhali country, the mountains reach a

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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maximum height of 8,000 ft., and the plains range in height from that of Dhala in the west, which is 4,500 ft., to that of the Audhali plateau in the centre, which is 6,750 ft. Thereafter the mountains and plains decrease in height the farther north they go until nothing remains but the great central Arabian desert, the Ruba-al-Khali with an average height of 2,500 ft.

Over in the east the coastal plain rapidly gives way to the great Plateau of the Jöl, a tableland deeply cut by rifts and valleys, the greatest of which is the famous Wadi Hadhramaut in the north. Thereafter the tableland ends abruptly and then begins the northern plain which runs up to the southern limits of the great sand dunes of the central desert.

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The full history of South-west Arabia, that is, of the Aden Protectorate and the Kingdom of the Yemen, has never been written and the travellers' tales of the Aden Protectorate and the historical records that do exist of the early history of the Yemen give no more than a glimpse of a period of history or of the authors' immediate surroundings. I do not propose to attempt to remedy this deficiency, but I must, for the proper understanding of my subject, give a brief historical outline of the events which led to the coming into existence of the Aden Protectorate in the form in which it was in 1931 when I first came to have personal acquaintance with that fascinating country. There has been no fundamental change in the form of the Protectorate since then, although as we shall see later, there has, of recent years, been considerable political and economic development.

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At about the time that these islands of ours were being conquered for the last time in their history by William the Norman, the Imam of the Yemen had overrun much of what is now the Western Aden Protectorate and was in effective control of the tribes between Lahej, Aden's near neighbour, and Loder the capital of the Audhali Sultanate. The Imam was not left in possession for very long, and the records show that in the latter half of the eleventh century the Abdalis of Lahej and the other tribes more remote from the Yemen border broke away from the Imamic control and once again became

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800 independent. They remained independent until the Yemeni
Y Imam was sufficiently strongly internally to try again to expand
175 the limits of his kingdom, but it was not until the middle of
648 the fourteenth century that the Imam of the time was able to
re-establish his control over Lahej.

A hundred years later the pendulum swung back again for
a brief period, and we find the Imam of that time trying to
Y crush an internal rebellion which seems to have had its origin
175 in Lahej and was led by one Malik Ali and his brother. The
648 Imam was unsuccessful and Malik Ali eventually established
721 himself on the Imamic throne and the Yemen's control of the
643 border tribes, including Lahej, was again established and continued
until the middle of the sixteenth century when the
Yemen was overrun by the Turks and it became a Province
of the Ottoman Empire and remained as such for nearly one
hundred years until the middle of the seventeenth century
when, on the Turks evacuating the country, the Imam was
able to re-establish his authority, not only in his own country
A but to some degree over the areas of the Protectorate adjacent
669 to the Yemen. The magic hundred played its part again, and
by the thirties of the eighteenth century disturbances in the
648 Yemen itself weakened the authority of the Imam and gave an
175 opportunity to the Sultans of Lahej, and indeed the other
Protectorate tribes, to break away and once more become
independent. A hundred years later and we came on the scene
and there began to come into existence that series of Treaties
which has established the Aden Protectorate as we know it at
A the present day.

This very brief historical sketch would not be complete
175 without mentioning the second coming of the Turks, which
648 occurred in the last century. They overran the Yemen, they
divested the Imam of his temporal authority and once again
they turned the country into a Turkish province. Not content
with their gains in the Yemen they poured over into the Protectorate
and in May 1872 were on the borders of Lahej but
a short distance from the town of Aden itself. There they
remained for some time and then withdrew back into the
Yemen, but it is not clear what caused them to do so because

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there does not seem to have been any offensive action on our part of sufficient magnitude to force them out of the Protectorate. 175 648

When I was searching for information about South-west Arabia, and it was only then that I realised how little had been written about that part of the world, I came on the following passage referring to this Turkish incursion in the only book published about Aden itself:

"Representations were at once made by Her Majesty's Government to the Porte who gave assurances that the troops would be withdrawn; but this was not done...." (The troops in question were either Turkish regular soldiers or Turkish led Yemeni irregulars.) The account continued: "...the Government of India authorised the Resident to support the Lahej Sultan but not to attack the Turks...."[1]

The Resident advanced into Lahej territory with a small armed force and the British and the Turks looked at each other for a period of seven months and then the Turks retired back into the Yemen. How often, in more recent years, have I been given precisely the same kind of contradictory instructions! Too often. Times may change, but the attitude of Government remains much the same and back-seat driving has been much facilitated by improved communications, with the result that nowadays the responsible officer on the spot either becomes so accustomed to referring to London that when in an emergency events outstrip even modern communications and he is required to use his own initiative, he is incapable of doing so and his "health" breaks down, or he refuses to submit to remote control, loses his temper, and "health" once again is invoked to explain his early retirement.

The important question is how was the Protectorate formed and why even to this day, when the Rulers of the Protectorate are under foreign domination, "British domination", have they always rejected the overtures of the Imams of the Yemen, who are like themselves Arabs and are, to a degree, their co-religionists. The answer to the second half of the question is that the Imam of the Yemen has always been, and still is, not

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[1] Hunter's *Statistical Account of the British Settlement of Aden*, 1877, p. 169.

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2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1
Yemen ML1

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771 only the temporal head of that country but is the spiritual
795 leader of the Zeidi sect, which is composed of those Shiahs
993 who follow the teaching of Muhammed Ibn Zaid, an inter-
175 preter of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammed. The Imams
trace their descent to Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, and
it is only of comparatively recent years that the Imamic
leadership has changed in character from the primarily spiritual
to the predominantly temporal, and even so, it has never lost
Y the essential spiritual element.

771 The majority of the inhabitants of the Yemen are of the
795 Sunni division of Islam and subscribe to the teachings of As
642 Sha'afi, another renowned interpreter of the sayings of the
643 Prophet. Thus successive Imams have maintained their temporal
798 authority in their country with the aid of the religious minority,
175 the tough Zeidi tribesmen of the Highlands. This they have
done with remarkable success and even today the Sha'afi
majority of the country have no real say in the government.
From time to time the Sha'afis have striven to rid themselves
of their Zeidi oppressors, but their success has never been more
than temporary and partial and the Imams have, for their
A part, been quite ruthless in re-establishing their authority,
Y and although they have had the prerogative of mercy it has
771 seldom, if ever, been exercised. Politically and socially the
178 Yemen has not advanced beyond the sixteenth century in
Europe, and if one thinks for a moment about our own religious
difficulties in this country at that period of history, it will not
be difficult to understand the intense distrust which exists
between the Zeidis and the Sha'afis, not only in the Yemen,
but beyond the borders of that country in the Aden Protectorate
where all the people are of the Sha'afi Sect of Islam.
There you have the fundamental reason for the existence of
A the Aden Protectorate.

175 The Protectorate came into being by mutual agreement,
648 and we were in effect invited to become the paramount power.
It was not in any way the conquest of a primitive and defenceless people by an up-to-date Western power with modern armament. In 1839, when we had established ourselves in what is now the Colony of Aden, the tribes of the hinterland were,

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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as they are to a large extent today, disunited, and in consequence, were in no position to resist the increasing power of the Yemen. The Imam of that time had settled his internal affairs, which had always been a brake on the territorial ambitions of the Imams, and was turning his attention to the establishment of his authority farther afield. Successfully to resist Yemen domination the tribes would have to unite or else ally themselves with a power capable of protecting them. Unity was at that time not practical politics so that there was, in fact, really no alternative but to find a big friend to protect them from the Zeidi bully. It was, therefore, with some relief that, once the initial shock of our boisterous arrival had passed, they turned to this new and undoubtedly powerful stranger for that protection which was vital to them if they were to escape domination by the Zeidis. Naturally enough it was the tribes in the immediate neighbourhood of Aden who were the first to enter into protective agreements, but gradually as our prestige spread fanwise through South-west Arabia, more and more tribes not under the immediate domination of the Imam of the Yemen, came into alliance with us, until by 1914 the Aden Protectorate had come into being in its present form.

We, for our part, were very ready to enter into these engagements with the tribes and for very nearly the same reason. We had but newly arrived in Aden and secured a foothold on the shore of Arabia and, following the practice which we had found to be so successful in India and which, to the surprise and alarm of the East India Company brought practically the whole of that sub-Continent under the British flag, were anxious to surround our new possession and its valuable harbour with friendly States which would act as a buffer between our property and any potential enemy from the landward side. Our motives were entirely selfish and our conduct remained so until this present century was well advanced.

The Treaties which were entered into between the Indian Government, acting as the agent for the paramount power the British Government, and the tribal leaders during this period were all in much the same form. The tribes undertook through their Rulers not to enter into negotiation with or to alienate

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648 their territory to any foreign power without the previous permission of the Government of India. In return we undertook to protect them from external aggression. Those were the main clauses, but there were, of course, subsidiary clauses which differed from Treaty to Treaty and which related to freedom of access to each other's territory, the protection of trade routes and similar matters. The main object of the Treaties was protection, protection from the Yemen as far as the tribes were concerned, and protection from the Yemen and the tribes themselves as far as we were concerned.

As the years went by and the buffer grew in size as more and more States came into alliance, so did our responsibilities to the people of the area grow, although it took us nearly a hundred years to realise our obligations, which we have not yet adequately discharged.

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631 The States are twenty-five in number, of which the Sultanate of Lahej is the senior, not only by virtue of its importance, but also because it was the first to enter into treaty relations with Her Majesty's Government. They vary greatly in size from the 40,000 square miles of the Quaiti Sultanate of Shihr and Mukalla, to the few unproductive acres of the Sultan of Bir Ali, an insignificant little sea port. The Rulers, who are either Sultans or Sheikhs or Amirs, or even Naqibs—it makes no difference to the importance of the State what title is held by the Ruler—are all independent in so far as their internal authority is concerned, and the only curbs on their power are tradition and the degree of independence of the people themselves. [184] [641] This latter varies with the geographical position and the nature of the terrain of the State. In the Yafa Highlands, which are almost inaccessible, every tribesman is a law unto himself and pays little heed to the titular leader, the Upper Yafa Sultan, unless the land is in grave danger when they rally to him until the danger is passed. In the Lowlands and in the Southern plain where the States are more vulnerable, there is a greater degree of obedience by the tribesmen to the authority of their Ruler, and such is the case where tribal territory abuts on to the Yemen in open country; country where the fear of Zeidi raids is greatest.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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579 had been done by the foreign elements in the population and blamed the Yemen labourers in the harbour, the cargo and the coal coolies, but they knew full well that the Yemenis had not been responsible for starting the trouble and had not been
167 alone in the pillaging and fire-raising. However, this hare
643 was duly hunted, and the control of landward immigration became a disturbing major problem and many and curious were the proposals and plans that were considered. A great fence was to be built round the landward side of the Colony, twenty to thirty miles in length at a cost which no-one troubled to discover; the Colony was to be cut in half by another fence across the Isthmus, turning Khormaksar and Sheikh Othman into a vast squatter camp of undesirables who could not gain entrance into the Fortress Area; watch towers with searchlights were to be constructed and supplemented by police motor patrols; the population was to be registered and the coolie lines moved from the vulnerable Steamer Point area, all complete with the coal wharves that they served and which were such an eyesore, across the harbour to the northern side. Gradually a more balanced view prevailed and only the last
[656] proposals became actualities. The population has been regis-
[657] tered and the coolies have been moved, not across the harbour, but from their disgraceful overcrowded dormitories to modern comfortable lines at Ma'alla; and the coal wharves are under construction, but whether there will be any coal to put on them when they are finished is quite a different matter. Every year less and less coal is imported into Aden, for ships bunkers, and very shortly the coaling ship will be almost unique.

563 I do not propose at this juncture to refer to the breaches of
579 the peace which occurred during the labour disturbances in 1955 when the Police Force behaved so admirably—that will come later—but I am going to relate two more examples of the speed with which events in the internal security field can move in Aden.

Less than two months after I became Governor I flew to Mukeiras for a few days. The day after my arrival I heard and saw an aeroplane circling round the landing ground, and

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625 well as the Western Protectorate, but in practice they have been far too busy in recent years dealing with Yemeni-inspired raiding and other disturbances in the Western Protectorate and only once in their history have they been employed in the Hadhramaut. The Levies have had heavy responsibilities and very hard has been their lot and very scanty the praise that those brave men have received. Shortly before my term of office expired a detachment of regular troops from the Army was stationed in Aden, to my great satisfaction. They were invaluable.

712 So far I have dealt solely with the Land Forces, but with only
● 648 a few thousand men, possibly 4,000 in all, however well
707 trained and however well armed and led, it would be virtually impossible to safeguard a frontier line of over 700 miles in length running through the most difficult country from aggression, and at the same time to maintain any reasonable degree of security in an area where social conditions today are equivalent to those existing in the Highlands of Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century, and which is twenty-five per cent. larger than the United Kingdom. That the frontier has been maintained and that security has increased of recent years is due very largely to the Royal Air Force, acting in the closest accord with the ground forces. Without the Royal Air Force my task would indeed have been difficult; I will go further and say quite frankly it would have been impossible.

000 As Governor I frequently had to authorise the use of air action against frontier raiders or recalcitrant tribesmen within Protectorate limits, and I have never been able to follow the almost hysterical reaction with which some sections of the population of these islands are affected whenever they read in the newspapers that bombing has taken place, or indeed that any form of air action has been used. It is for this reason that I shall deal at some length with that most humane of all the various methods by which law and order can be maintained by force, the employment of aircraft.

I do not propose to enter the lists on the side of those who favour this form of policing, nor do I propose to side with the many people who have genuine misgivings, but I am going

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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to state the facts and leave the conclusions to be drawn by others. 000

Let us take frontier control first. The Suzerain power must carry out her obligations to the Rulers and peoples over whom she exercises authority, and the primary obligation is to protect them and their territories from external aggression. This is 648 especially so when the nature of the agreements between the paramount power and the subordinate Rulers is specifically protective, as is the case with the primary treaties between Her Majesty's Government and the Aden Protectorate States. Of this there can be no shadow of doubt. A further obligation 000 is one that all paramount powers have in regard to the neighbours of the States they protect, and that is to ensure as far as possible that the boot is not on the other foot. In other words, to ensure that the subordinate States do not violate the frontiers of neighbouring foreign States with whom their Suzerain is in friendly treaty relation.

The first essential in all frontier control is information. Information of troop and tribal concentrations and the movements of motor and other forms of transport, unusual movements that is, and of any suspicious changes from the normal, such as, for instance, in Arabia, the sudden movement of camel herds from their normal grazing grounds or the presence of tribesmen in normally unfrequented areas. Information to be of real value must be accurate and also it must be speedy and come before the event to which it relates. It is no good being told precisely what happened after the affray or the incursion has occurred. The Authorities must know what is probably going to happen so that action can be taken to prevent completely, or at least to reduce, the magnitude of a border incident. Border posts equipped with W.T. sets are essential and so are Intelligence Agents, but when the frontier is some 700 miles in length and runs through precipitous mountain areas and waterless, sandy and stony wastes, it is impossible to provide and garrison enough of the first and supply enough of the second for them alone to be really effective. Both Agents and Post Commanders base their information on travellers' tales and hearsay, unless of course the Post is itself attacked, and

000 normally time is required to assess the value of such evidence before action can be taken to deal with the situation. To rely solely on Agents and Post Commanders for information would result in many false alarms with consequent waste of time and would fatigue unnecessarily the military forces charged with the task of frontier control.

648 The ideal is a combination of air and land, and that is pre-
701 cisely how watch along the Aden frontier is maintained. The
203 frontier Posts are sited in strategic positions and are provided
707 with W.T. sets, but owing to the nature of the ground they
are often many miles apart, especially on the Aden-Saudi frontier where their number is strictly conditioned by their accessibility to adequate supplies of water. Information comes in from the Posts either from the Political Officer for the area who may be there at the time, or from the local Commander of the Post, and it is checked forthwith by a reconnaissance flight by the Royal Air Force when it relates to troop movements or tribal concentration. It is often only a matter of an hour or so from the time that the information is received to the time that the pilot's report confirming or disproving the information is available. In times of particular tension reporting from Posts is supplemented by frontier patrols, by aircraft flying along the Aden side of the frontier. These patrols have proved to be particularly effective over the sandy and stony desert across which runs the Aden-Saudi Arabian frontier; camels and vehicles can be hidden in Wadis and can travel at night, but neither camels nor vehicles can pass over open country, especially sandy country, without leaving tracks for the airmen to see in the morning.

Speedy and accurate information from the desert areas and from the mountainous regions would be impossible without the use of aircraft. In both types of country the air-land form of frontier control and reconnaissance has been proved to be not only the most efficient, but also by far the most economical both in men and machines, and in money also. It is not inhuman and is not unsporting. True, the Yemen, in my time, had no Air Force and Saudi Arabia nothing much in that line, but the object is to prevent frontier violation not only by our

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neighbours, but also by our own people, in which we are doing our neighbours a service.

Much has been said and written in the Press about frontier violation by reconnaissance aircraft operating from Aden. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred such reports are without foundation. It is impossible for any but the most skilled trained observer on the ground to predict precisely, without the aid of precision instruments, where an aircraft is flying in relation to the ground, especially if it is at any height. Errors do occur from time to time, but they are few and far between and are generally errors of navigation committed by navigators inexperienced in the conditions prevailing in the Aden Protectorate.

The next essential, after information of an incursion has been received and confirmed, is action. The intruder must be evicted —that is an immediate necessity. If you catch a stranger in your house in the middle of the night packing up the spoons, you try to arrest him and to kick him out. You are quite entitled to do so. If he seems to be too much for you to tackle alone you call the Police and they take on the task. If the intruder shows fight and a disinclination to leave, the Police use "reasonable force" and take the fellow away. He may get hurt in the process; that's just too bad. No one writes to the papers and asks questions in the House of Commons, but transfer the scene to a Colony, multiply the intruder by one hundred, substitute a desire to burn and pillage for a liking for other people's spoons and an aeroplane for the police, and there are long articles in the Press and shoals of questions asked in the House of Commons. 010 0

Many people feel quite genuinely unhappy about the use of aircraft against ground forces, which is understandable, but springs from ignorance of the way in which aircraft are used. War and fighting with lethal weapons of the modern sort is beastly and horrible to a degree, and the longer it goes on, the more are the casualties and the more horrible it becomes. Therefore, surely the most humane thing to do is to stop the fighting as soon as possible with the fewest possible casualties, especially among our own troops, or to prevent it altogether.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

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703 The way to do this is to use the Air Arm as much as possible.
The Arabs are a proud race and rate personal bravery highly,
as highly as they do prestige, and frankly, that is far too high.
They will not give in to an inferior force, but will shoot it out
to the end. They are unlikely to give in to a slightly superior
force, but they will give in to an overwhelming force and often
be secretly glad to do so.

648 I found when using the Government Guards or the Aden
726 Protectorate Levies to deal with petty malefactors that
703 if I sent a small but adequate force there was invariably
a fight, but if I sent far more men than were necessary
the malefactors' pride was saved and there was no blood
shed.

648 An example of air-land co-operation based on actual fact
726 involves an aeroplane and two patrol cars. The aircraft was
703 on frontier reconnaissance patrol; the pilot spotted a lorry
travelling southwards inside the Protectorate border in a
706 prohibited zone. This was up on the Saudi Arabia-Aden fron-
707 tier. He circled and at the same time wirelessed to the nearest
frontier Post for patrol cars. The lorry was halted by a burst
of fire well in front. A message was dropped and the lorry was
ordered to remain stationary and wait for the patrol cars. It
did so. The aircraft guided the cars to the lorry. It was loaded
with rifles for distribution in the Protectorate and carried a
number of well-armed tribesmen. There was no fight; the
aircraft was the overwhelming force. The tribesmen were dis-
armed and the lorry was taken to the nearest Hadhrami Bedouin
Legion Post. If the aircraft had not been used on patrol, the
lorry would not have been spotted, and if the aircraft had not
been there when the patrol cars arrived, there would have
been a very unpleasant scene indeed. The tribesmen would
certainly not have given in without a fight and lost the rifles,
each one of which was worth locally one hundred pounds
sterling.

648 In action against raiders from across the frontier in hilly
country, aircraft are not nearly so lethal as many think because
726 the lightly armed raiding tribesman has so much cover at
707 his disposal. In fact they are very hard indeed to hit at all.

Casualties in these conditions are few as between the aeroplane 648
and the enemy, but the aeroplane has a very considerable 726
moral effect on our own troops as well as on the enemy. 707
Ground-air co-operation can work wonders in bringing matters to a speedy conclusion by the denial of commanding features to the raiders and by giving covering support to advancing ground troops, and casualties among our own men are reduced to a minimum.

Aircraft operating alone cannot hold territory, nor can they in difficult country deny ground to the enemy indefinitely. I am writing of course of Colonial conditions and not of the use of thousands of aircraft in concentrated bombing operations as was the practice in Europe towards the end of the last war. What aircraft can do is to transport troops quickly and support those troops once they are in action, and that is the way they have been used in the Aden Protectorate. In this way lives are saved on *both* sides and, incidentally, it is in the long run the most economical method as well as the most efficient for watch and ward on a frontier in the conditions prevailing in the Aden Protectorate.

Now let us consider the role of the Air Arm in Internal Security work, and in particular the vexed question of bombing. Breaches of the peace in the Protectorate can be due to a 721
number of causes and take various different forms. Sometimes there may be a genuine misunderstanding and a grudge or grievance nursed until it explodes into murder; sometimes a constitutional dislike, not unknown in the West, of paying taxes, takes the form of armed resistance to authority, the authority of the tribal Ruler; and sometimes a breach of the peace is the direct result of bribery, by a so-called friendly power, to murder, pillage and burn and disrupt security so that the economic, political and social development of the country is retarded. This last form of evil doing has been more prevalent in recent years. Uneducated people are easily misled by ready talkers, and rifles and money mean much to the wild tribesmen, especially when distributed with a generous hand. They little realise the harm they are doing themselves by burning schools and dispensaries. They are to be pitied as well as

721 punished. But it matters little what the cause of the crime, it is the method of punishment which is under examination. Let us, therefore, trace a normal sequence of events.

The incident has occurred, and the guilty party has been determined without doubt by the Political Authorities. Their Ruler asks Government to aid him in bringing them to account if it is beyond his power to act alone. The offenders are called upon to surrender themselves and explain their conduct. They do not appear on the date stated and no excuse is offered. The Ruler orders them to pay a fine in rifles or in money or in both. The fine is always well within the means of the guilty party to pay and is never vindictive. Payment is not made so the transgressors are warned that action will be taken to destroy their property, generally tribal towers, to the extent of the fine. Care is taken to make sure that the leader's property is first on the list for attention, and great care is taken to ensure
921 that excessive damage is not done. Aerial photographs are
726 taken and the actual towers or houses carefully identified.
707 Twenty-four hours' notice of air action is then given and the
• 648 transgressors are warned to remove their belongings. If at
any time before the expiry of the warning period the persons concerned submit or make any move indicative of their willingness to submit, the whole operation is postponed immediately. If no move has been made by the guilty party then a further warning of one hour is given immediately
[202] prior to the air action. The first warning is dropped by air on
the village or towers of the offenders, and to ensure that there is no mistake it is sent also by hand through neutral agents, probably Saiyids, but the second warning is from the air alone. The operation takes place and the bombing or rocketing of the buildings is very accurate and no unnecessary damage is caused. Quite often the offenders and their friends gather on a nearby hill feature to watch the aircraft in action. The incident is over. The slate has been wiped clean. There have been no casualties, there were not intended to be; only material damage has been done.

I do not recall that during the time I was closely connected with the Protectorate there were, at any time, any casualties

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as a result of such operations. To have inflicted the same punishment in the more remote areas of the Protectorate, with land forces, would certainly have resulted in casualties on both sides, and would have been a long and laborious operation. Justice in the wilder and less civilised areas of the world, where memories are short, must not only be seen to be done, but it must be swift. Air action fulfils both these requirements, and is at the same time the most humane method. It seldom leaves any lasting feeling of resentment and more often than not normal relations have been resumed with the offenders in a few months or even weeks.

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Sometimes air action cannot solve the Internal Security problem quite so readily and this is when the recalcitrants have no permanent dwellings, but live in grass huts or caves or just under trees in close proximity to the frontier. When they have been tempted and have fallen and have committed some gross offence then action has to be taken by air against their flocks, the only property they have, and when this fails action is taken to deny to them their grazing areas. Sometimes even this does not produce the required result, which is to persuade them to make submission and live in peace with their neighbours. Then ground and air action is taken to round up the men or to destroy them if they resist; the normal procedure when dealing with dangerous armed criminals in any part of the world. This may take long to achieve when the frontier is near and supplies of foodstuffs and money and shelter and compensation for damage done are all readily available from outside the Protectorate. The main fault is not with these poor, foolish, misled creatures, but with those responsible for leading them astray. They are the people who most deserve punishment and not their unfortunate dupes; but the principals are far away and out of reach in a "friendly" country. The loyal and staunch tribesmen, our friends, know where the fault really lies. We may understand why the punishment cannot fall where the result would be immediately successful in stopping at once the bribery and corruption which is the root of the matter, but they who depend on us and are loyal to us and who suffer from the depredations of the disrupters of the

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peace have not our understanding of the world-wide considerations which influence our policy. They cannot understand our reluctance to take action, and I confess that on occasions I have been just as mystified.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1
Yemen ML 1

CHAPTER SEVEN

Travels in the Protectorate

DURING my period of office as Governor from 1951 to 1956 our policy in the Protectorate continued to be that of developing as much as possible, with the limited resources of men and money at our disposal, the economic, the political and the social life of the Protectorate. As I have already indicated, in all forms of development the first essential is to improve security, because no progress is possible unless peaceful conditions can be attained and maintained. Initially before the full force of Yemen reaction was felt, our progress was rapid and areas in the Western Protectorate which had been riven by feuds and in which every man's hand had been raised for generations against his neighbour, were pacified. Unfortunately this progress could not be maintained and eventually much of the effort which should have been directed to pacifying the still unsettled areas, had to be diverted to maintaining the ground gained and to dealing with disturbances on the Aden-Yemen frontier. A 648

Yemen reaction to the work which we were doing in the Protectorate was not due directly to the Federation policy which was announced in January 1953, and about which I shall have more to say later, though there is no doubt that that announcement stimulated the Yemen Government to greater efforts than they had made before to disrupt the political stability of the Protectorate. Ever since the present Imam had decided to bring out of cold storage the Yemen claim to the Protectorate, tension had been increasing. He viewed with disfavour, tinged with fear, our successful efforts to advance the well-being of the States, partly because he foresaw that the Y 648 643

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

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more civilised the people became the more difficult would it be for him at some future date to impose his will upon them, and partly because he feared the reaction of the Sha'afi majority in the Yemen to the improvements which were manifest in the Protectorate and which contrasted sharply with conditions in their own country.

There was nothing new in the methods that the Imam used to interrupt progress in the Protectorate, which varied from promoting frontier raids and hiring assassins to formal protests to our diplomatic representative at Taiz, or directly through his Minister to the Foreign Office in London, claiming, as he did, that every new school and every new road which was opened in the Protectorate was a breach of what had come to be known as the *status quo* Article of the Treaty of 1934. You see, although the old Imam most certainly understood clearly that Article 3 of the Treaty of 1934 referred solely to the frontier position, his son chose to interpret the Article as referring to the whole of the Protectorate, thus to his understanding the *status quo* included any form of change, such as the Federation proposals as a major example, to the opening of a new school or dispensary as a minor example. He protested and protested, but these protests were the least of the troubles that this tiresome fellow contrived to create. In spite, however, of all his efforts progress did not come to an end and it continued, even when the rich diet of slander provided by the Egyptian radio propaganda caused some slight biliousness in the more settled and prosperous areas bordering on the Colony.

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The Imam Ahmad was not the only critic of our Protectorate policy. There were others nearer home who, like all critics, became most vociferous when things were going badly. There were some who said that too much was being attempted, and others that too little was being done, and in the Protectorate itself there were a number of people who had misgivings every time there was a set-back, but fortunately the majority of the Rulers and their people realised that the task which had been undertaken could not be accomplished by a gentle stroll up the hill of progress. It was going to be a stiff, hard climb with very nearly as many downs as ups, but what mattered was not the

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incident of travel but the overall progress that was made and 178
that was, all things considered, reasonably satisfactory. 177

Progress throughout the area would have been more speedy ○○○
and more spectacular if it had been possible to observe the old proverb in our dealings with some of the Rulers that "to spare the rod is to spoil the child". Children some of them were, and Teddy Boys were not lacking among their subjects, and while I agree that it is better whenever possible to lead children, there are times when even the most amiable child must be coerced in its own interest, and I have never faltered in my opinion that an ash plant, properly applied, is one of the few things that is effective in dealing with young thugs in this or any other country.

I think I can best give a general idea of the people of the Protectorate by describing briefly some of the journeys which I made to some of the States, and some of the people I met. These journeys are typical of what, during my term of office, were certainly monthly occurrences and for periods at a time were a weekly event. No one can hope to govern successfully unless he knows the people, and what is more important, they know him, so that whenever time allowed I toured formally and informally every part of the Protectorate, except Upper Yafa, to which neither I nor the Imam could gain access.

DHALA

Shortly after I became Governor I decided to pay another 648
visit to the Amirate of Dhala, and one morning I drove myself 643
in my Land-Rover, accompanied by a few Government Guards, across the desert to Lahej and on through the Haushabi country up into the foothills of the Amirate. Just below the final ascent up to the Dhala tableland I was met by the Naib, or Deputy Ruler. He was not a very exciting-looking person, being under middle height, very thin and having some congenital infirmity which caused him to drag one foot, but however unprepossessing his outward appearance, there was no doubt about his stoutness of heart or his loyalty, and his ability to ride up and down the hills of his homeland was quite

648 astonishing. He was certainly not an indifferent shot with a rifle
643 and surprised Bill Goode on one occasion by shooting a chikor (hill partridge) with a ·303 Lee-Enfield rifle when the bird was
000 actually in flight. He was acting for his uncle, the old Amir Nasser, who, since the murderous attack at Christmas time in 1950 on Major Basil Seager, C.M.G., O.B.E., at that time British Agent for the Western Protectorate, was living in retirement at Lahej.

Once we had got up the rather difficult final pass on to the plateau the last few miles of the drive through the low hills were quite delightful. The air was cool and the country green, and the Naib's Tribal Guards and tribesmen on the hilltops guarding our passage and firing shots of welcome in the air as we drove past were a romantic and picturesque sight.

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712 We went straight to the Political Officer's house a mile or so from the old grey town of Dhala, which looked as sinister as ever as it straggled up the hillside to the ancient castle on the summit. There I met the notables and tribal leaders who had gathered in strength, while the guns of the castle slowly—oh, so slowly—fired a seventeen-gun salute. The guns were very old, and it was more dangerous to be behind them than in front of them. They had a tendency to explode if too much black powder was used in the charge, and there had been a nasty accident some few months earlier at the time of the Idd celebrations which had reduced the number of guns and gunners available for ceremonial purposes.

648 After the tribesmen and the notables had taken their departure, the Naib and I, with the Political Officer, went into the latter's office and talked about local affairs. Among other things the Naib deplored the kindness shown by the Imam to the Amir Haidera, his cousin and the son of the old Amir Nasser, who had been a power in the land until his conduct had become quite outrageous and a climax had been reached when he seized the Treasury and revolted against his father. We took action to bring him to reason, but he fled across the frontier and found refuge in the Yemen town of Qataba, from which place he never ceased to intrigue in the Amirate. Just before sunset the Naib said farewell and went off across the plain to his house just

outside the town, and as darkness fell the guns of the fort ceased to boom their still unfinished salute. 648

The next day the Political Officer took me to see the place 000 where Seager had been attacked as he, all unsuspecting, walked with his wife, a brave lady who did her best to beat off her husband's assailants until the Government Guard escort could come up. They had been told by Seager to follow some little distance behind so that he and his wife could enjoy their stroll in private. There I found a small heap of stones marking the spot and I had them scattered because there was no point in perpetuating the memory of a shameful incident. Seager had, I am glad to say, recovered, and the would-be assassins had been punished, that is, those who had not fled to the security of the Yemen. As far as I was concerned the chapter was closed.

There was time to spare before we were due to lunch with the Naib, so I formed my escort into a line of beaters and for an hour or so we wandered over the slopes of the nearby hills and found some hares among the scrub. Then back across the plateau to Dhala and up to the castle where I had first stayed twenty years before.

The Naib met us at the entrance and after I had inspected the Guard of Tribal Guards I was ushered into a long narrow room where some of the guests had already assembled. We shook hands and took our seats on the floor around the walls. I was seated at one end on the right of the Naib and on his left was the Political Officer, and as more and more guests entered they gave the customary salutation and we rose and I shook hands with them and they took their places round the walls. The guests were a curious collection, most of those present being tribal leaders and notables from the area, but there were others from neighbouring districts and, of course, the soldiers of my escort and my own personal servants. The people of 146
Dhala have one serious vice and that is that they grow and eat 184
Qāt, which absorbs a great deal of their vitality and practically 147
all their money; in consequence, they are physically well below the ordinary standard of the Protectorate, and in appearance I think they are best described by the American adjective "mean". Personally, I have always liked the country better 000

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636 brothers all expected to be able to guide Abdullah in what they
628 considered to be the right direction, and in consequence Abdullah was often the recipient of contrary advice and in a dilemma, but there was one thing about which he had no doubt and that was his dislike of the interminable blood feuds. He sought our help to put an end to them and at the same time to set up an administration. His request was granted and a motorable track was driven through the mountains to Yeshbum and Said, the two towns of the Sheikhdom, opening up the country to the outside world. Truces were made between the tribal septs which were guaranteed by Abdullah as Regent for his father and by Government, and in a short while peace came to a land which for so long had known nothing but strife.

636 The negotiating of the truces was, in this case, not parti-
628 cularly difficult because everyone was tired of fighting and only too anxious to come to an agreement, provided they could do so with honour. The authority of the Sheikh, backed by the power of the Government, was an overwhelming reason for suspending the feuds, and what was essential, a reason that could be seen by their neighbours and would be generally acknowledged as adequate. It is not only in Surbiton that the opinion of the neighbours is of importance.

Such truces are normally made for a few months in the first instance and then renewed for longer and longer periods until no-one troubles to remember when they lapse. When this stage is reached it does not matter whether they are in force or not because the reason for the truce has been forgotten and peace and good relations have become the accustomed way of life. Sometimes feuds are ended definitely during a truce by the casting up of the accounts of the dead and wounded on either side during the period of the feud and the striking of a balance; the difference being assessed at so much a head in accordance with local custom and a payment of "blood money", as it is called, being made from the debtors' side to the creditors' side.

636 Strenuous efforts were made to produce an administration
648 and eventually one began to take shape, but it was painfully slow and the whole project very nearly had to be abandoned. The real trouble here was lack of money. It generally is. Money

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was required not only to produce the buildings to house the administrative staff and to pay for the staff and to build roads and open schools and increase the number of dispensaries, but also to provide a stipend for the Ruler and to placate tiresome relatives and soothe, temporarily, until the administration had gained strength, troublesome tribesmen who looked with some suspicion on the innovation and had a constitutional antipathy to the payment of taxes and attendance in court. There had been too little money for too long, but in the end the need, the essential need, for financial assistance was accepted by Her Majesty's Government and this embryonic administration, together with others in the Protectorate in like circumstances, received an annual grant which was just sufficient to enable the administrative machines to run without undue friction and to grow stronger.

To anyone who does not know the circumstances of the case it must seem short-sighted that no adequate provision was made, adequate financial provision, for this project before it was undertaken. In fact, as in every project, however small, estimates were prepared but unfortunately they proved, as they so often do these days, to be inadequate. Somebody obviously was seriously at fault and to a degree I suppose the blame should lie with myself, but some share of the blame can reasonably be transferred to London. The Treasury are the custodians of the United Kingdom's money, money which has been contributed through the Inland Revenue and other channels to finance the United Kingdom and, incidentally, the poorer Colonial territories. On the whole, they carry out their duty very well, but so tight on the purse strings have their fingers become that in some Colonial territories they have induced what I can only describe as a Treasury complex. The yard-stick against which demands and requests for funds have come to be measured in many Colonies is not the essential minimum financial requirement, but what it is thought that the Treasury can be persuaded to give. Two very different matters.

Fear that the cost, the full cost, of a scheme essential to the welfare of the Colony, if disclosed, will mean the immediate and total rejection of the scheme has induced more than one

636 •648 administrator to understate the true requirement, more by wishful thinking than deliberately. The result is that too little is asked for, less is provided by the Treasury and the consequent mess costs much more to clear up than would have been the case if an adequate sum had been demanded and granted in the beginning. Sometimes I fear it is forgotten in the United Kingdom that there are able and honest people outside the corridors of Whitehall, who have the interests of the Nation at heart. More trust abroad would mean less frustration and loss of confidence and would not cost any more, in fact, there would be a saving. 636

646 To return to the Aulakis. When I visited the Sheikhdom for the first time I drove up from Aden through Dathina with its funny republican experiment, where the three major tribes had stopped killing each other and were trying to run their own affairs by means of an unwieldy council with a revolving President, who held office for one year. The Sheikh of each tribe in turn became the President of the Council and a harassed Political Officer was endeavouring, with not a very great degree of success, to keep the Council on the rails and to prevent the members from too much feathering of their own nests. It was obvious that there would have to be a return to a more practical, if less liberal form of Government in the near future.

000 The Political Officer for the Aulaki area drove the Land-Rover so that I had ample time to see the country through which we were passing. As we went eastward I was particularly interested to see how the new security was bringing people back to the long untilled lands. Fields were being cultivated and houses rebuilt. There were flocks on the hillsides and on several occasions wild-looking men with antiquated, but still lethal, weapons rushed down from a nearby hill feature and threw themselves in front of the car and brought it to a halt. Clad mainly in blue dye and scarcely adequate kilts, they crowded round the car and shook hands with the Political Officer and myself.

"Peace be with you," was their salutation.

"And to you peace," was our reply.

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[541] [538] topical calypsos or, to use their own word, *zamils*, rhyming lines with a topical theme, part repeated by the chorus of tribesmen. It was the first time I had seen one of these tribal demonstrations, and I was thrilled as the blue kilted tribesmen, led by their Amir, moved in what seemed to be a tail-less snake of men, three abreast, round and round, coiling and uncoiling while rifles were being fired in the air with a delightful disregard for the eventual destination of their contents among the surrounding hills.

ooo The procession over, I walked up the Wadi with the Amir on one side and his eldest brother on the other, and as we passed a very modern-looking gun it commenced to fire my salute. It was some ten feet above us on the bank, and I inquired from where they had obtained the blank ammunition for the gun, for this was no black powder affair, and was not altogether surprised to learn that live ammunition was being used. I should like to have hastened my footsteps and got well clear before the next round, but that would have been very poorly thought of, so we continued our stately walk without haste or damage to anything, except our ear-drums.

628 648 • 636 The new administration made a good start, but that salute of guns had been heard in the Yemen, although nearly two years were to pass before the re-opening of an old family dispute split the ruling family and gave the Imam his opportunity. The Yemen took sides with money and gifts of rifles and ammunition, and once again shots whistled along the narrow streets of Said, and as the infection spread and the tribesmen became restive, Abdullah, the Amir, faced serious trouble. By the grace of God and the opportune visit to the Protectorate of the then Minister of State, Mr. Hopkinson, now Lord Colyton, the additional financial help we needed so badly was made available to the young and struggling administration. Much can be done with money in Arabia, even to the extent of starting and stopping wars, as Lawrence demonstrated in the Hedjaz.

63.6 A young Assistant Adviser came to the Aulakis at the same time (the designation "Political Officer" had been abolished, and "Assistant Adviser" introduced as being more truly

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643 year of my term of office, has become the power behind the throne and manages his son and the State with skill and adroitness. His State borders the Yemen and the frontier is a continuous source of trouble with that country. The Sharif is no advocate of appeasement. He firmly believes that offence is the best defence, and he and his son have maintained their [648] position with our help against all comers. For some reason, as obscure to me as it is to the Oil Company who recently gave up their prospecting concession for the area, the Sharif and the Imam are convinced (it's the only point on which they don't differ sharply) that Beihan floats on oil and in consequence the Yemen has been more aggressive on the Beihan border than elsewhere and the struggle has been long and bitter between the Sharif and the neighbouring Yemeni Governors of Harib and Marib. The Imam would like to isolate Beihan from the rest of the Protectorate and has tried every trick in his extensive repertoire of deceptive magic, but the Sharif has so far more than held his own.

[648] In 1954 a Conference was held at Mukeiras in the Audhali Sultanate with the Yemen Governor of Beidha, the Qadhi Muhammed Abdullah Ash Shami, with the object of trying to settle some of the Beihan border disputes. The Sharif and Ash Shami had had many hard and bitter duels in the past and there was little love lost between them, though I have no doubt a certain degree of mutual respect had been created. The Sharif flew from Beihan in a Valetta aircraft of the Royal Air Force which made a bad landing at Mukeiras, and bouncing off the landing ground, came to rest, rather dilapidated, on a nearby hill. The accident was witnessed by Ash Shami and the British Adviser who, with some local notables, were awaiting the arrival of the Sharif. They were horrified when they saw the undercarriage disintegrate and the plane collapse on its belly, and with the rest of the reception committee, rushed across the landing ground to help the survivors out of the wreckage. The first person to emerge from the damaged plane was the Sharif himself; unhurried and dignified he stepped out of the door which he had forced open, paused to light a cigarette, oblivious of the serious fire risk, and strolled over to receive

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

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Ash Shami's congratulations on his escape, to which he replied with his unexpectedly nice smile:

"You thought you had seen the last of me, didn't you? You are wrong again."

In 1956 when he was informed that we had taken the initiative and landed a force on Egyptian soil, he is reported to have said:

"Praise be to God, the old woman [Britannia] has woken up at last."

He has no love for Nasser and his poisonous radio broadcasts [648] which have done so much harm. I am very glad I was not there to hear what he had to say when he learnt we had gone from Egyptian soil with the task we had set ourselves uncompleted. My sympathy is with those who carried the news to him; his forthrightness could be very embarrassing even when there was much less excuse for plain speaking.

AUDHALI

Farther to the west, and also on the borders of the Yemen, Sultan Saleh bin Hussein, the young Audhali Ruler, had consolidated his position to an extent which enabled him to remain unshaken, though it was a severe personal shock to him as he trusted their Sheikh, when the Dammanis, a sub-section of the Audhalis, forcibly resisted, at the instigation of the Yemen, our attempt to link the Audhali capital, Loder, with Nisab by motor road. The Yemen feared these new communications which would do much to consolidate the Protectorate and which in some peculiar way they seemed to connect with the supposed oil resources of Beihan. Shots were fired and on a show of force by the Aden Protectorate Levies the Dammani rebels fled across the border to be rewarded, encouraged and sustained by the authorities at Beidha, which is only about thirteen miles from Mukeiras and which I have myself visited on more than one occasion. From the Yemen the rebels raided into their own country at night, returning to their base in the Yemen before dawn.

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Ever obedient to the referee's whistle we played the game

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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according to the rules and tried to stop the raiders on our side of the frontier, but it was an impossible task that we had set ourselves and the tribesmen wondered at our stupidity. They knew that we had only to take direct action against the Yemen and rap them firmly over the knuckles and they would cease to give sanctuary to the Dammanis or anyone else, and, until they had forgotten the pain, be much better behaved. The tribesmen wondered why we did not take air action against the military barracks outside Beidha. They knew we had the aircraft and when nothing was done some of them began to wonder if the radio propaganda directed against us from Cairo was indeed true. We had left India and Burma and Ceylon and we were about to leave the Sudan. Was it possible, the waverers asked, that we were going to leave Aden and by so doing leave them to the mercy of the Imam and his Zeidis? If so, it would be as well to make what arrangement they could with the enemy, the Yemen, before we went, and it was too late. The Sultan himself never wavered even when the pressure was such that it would not have been surprising if he had shown some sign of the strain he was enduring. In public his demeanour was calm and cheerful, but in private, on my frequent visits to his State, he expressed his tribesmen's feelings very clearly. We had known each other for more than twenty years, and he talked to me as a friend rather than as the representative of the paramount power.

"I want to know," he said to me one day, "precisely why your Government does not take direct action against the Yemen, action which you could take at once with the resources at your disposal in Aden, and action which you know full well would bring all my troubles to an end in a few hours."

I explained the probable effect on world opinion of direct action by us against the Yemen, and I made the best case I could in the circumstances. The answer I received was on the following lines:

"I understand your arguments and I can follow the reasoning of your Government, but I don't agree with you and I don't consider that your Government's policy is the best in the circumstances. However, I realise that your Government has

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

many things to consider about which my tribesmen and I have little knowledge and I know that I must be patient. Remember, though, and let your Government remember, that we are primitive people, and like all primitive people we think with our eyes. We believe what we see and we understand only what is before our eyes. When my people see the Yemen encouraging the Dammanis to burn their crops and are not allowed by you to retaliate in kind, and when they see that no action is taken by you against the Yemen, then they believe that either you are afraid of the Yemen, or else that you don't care what happens to them. If you cannot do the one thing which will stop this trouble, then give us the arms to defend ourselves in our own way and let my tribesmen know that I speak the truth when I say you are on their side and care very much what happens to them." 648

Sometimes it is not easy to be the person set in authority over others, whether it be as Governor or as Sultan. 000

My last visit to the Audhali country was in 1956 shortly before I left Aden forever. I went by air to Mukeiras and spent a few days shooting pigeons and chikor in country I had come to know so well. Relations with the Yemen were still strained and my shooting was complicated by the security measures it was only sensible to take. We came to no harm, my six faithful guards and I, and we had a great deal of fun. On the last day of my short stay I said farewell to the Sultan and his brothers, and the tribesmen assembled on the edge of the landing ground, and then climbed into the waiting aeroplane which was already loaded with my guards and our kit. We taxied down to the end of the runway, the engines were tested, and we were away on the "take off". We gained speed rapidly, passing the Sultan and his people lining the edge of the runway who all waved their last farewell, to which we in the plane replied by waving our hands at the windows, and then, suddenly, instead of becoming airborne, we began to slow down. The runway was rapidly coming to an end and beyond there was a very nasty drop. It was a question of whether or not we could stop before we reached the end. We all held on tight and probably prayed, I know I did, as we watched from the 648 000

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701 independent commanders in out-of-the-way places. In a serious crisis the Commandant of the Legion and the Military Assistant would be flown up to the nearest Post and the Commandant would take over the general control of the situation, sure in the knowledge that he could call on the Military Assistant, an experienced soldier, for advice at any time. Behind them both there was Hugh Boustead, capable of dealing with almost any situation single-handed, and behind him was Aden and the Royal Air Force ready and willing to help at any time. Everything was in good shape and I never had any qualms about our ability to deal with interlopers on the Saudi frontier.

• 648 [315] In 1955 Her Majesty's Government formally declared the co-ordinates of the line south of which they would not tolerate the unrestricted movement of foreign subjects, and it was not long after this announcement was made to the Saudi Government that an American oil-survey party operating in two sections with an armed Saudi escort, trespassed in two separate places. They were located from the air and in no time the Military Assistant with an adequate escort from the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion, had moved by air and Land-Rover to intercept them. The error of their ways was pointed out to them and they withdrew promptly with their escort, leaving their expensive equipment behind in spite of being told they could take it with them. The escort had second thoughts and returned and were promptly taken into custody and disarmed without a shot being fired and later sent to Jedda by a civil Air Line. As far as I know the equipment is still in the desert; it certainly was in 1956 when I drove that way, and it was already showing very clearly the effects of sun, sand and the bedouin.

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[181] It was in the same year, 1955, that the Buraimi business in Trucial Oman where the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi meets the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, upset King Saud. Stolen fruit is always so much sweeter than that which is got by legitimate means and in this case both *hasad* and *sharf* were involved—"jealousy" and "honour", those two curses of Arabia which have kept the peoples and the countries divided for generations and generations. The King showed his irritation with Great Britain by sending arms to the bedouin in the northern areas

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of the Protectorate, and his officials encouraged them to revolt against their Arab Rulers, to whose assistance we would be bound, in such circumstances, to send our Forces. The first consignment of rifles arrived by lorry and they were distributed to all and sundry, just within Saudi limits where the Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Aden frontiers all meet, and some of them fell into the hands of Yemenis with no love for their Ruler. This did not suit the Imam at all and he protested to the Saudis, not against the distribution of arms, but against it being done so close to his border and in such a haphazard manner. The Saudi officials changed their methods and the next lorry load of rifles was sent right in to Quaiti State territory where it was captured promptly by the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion with the help of the Royal Air Force. The Saudi authorities were discouraged by the impenetrable screen of patrols by air and by land which was introduced forthwith and no more attempts were made to send arms to the tribesmen. Instead, the tribesmen were encouraged to go to Saudi Arabia and collect the arms personally, at the same time taking an oath to use them against their "oppressors". They went in some numbers, caring little about the distance and less about the oath, which seemed to these simple-minded people a small price to pay for a valuable weapon. Most of them did not class either their Rulers or ourselves as "oppressors". They were much more likely to regard in that light a neighbour who had been disagreeable recently about irrigation water, or with whom they had a long standing private vendetta.

The tribesmen moved more quickly than the Saudis had anticipated and a camp had to be pitched for them in which to await the arrival of the promised arms. This did not please the tribesmen, who were anxious to get home before their absence had attracted attention and they grew impatient and quarrelled with the Saudis and with each other. The rifles still did not appear and the tribesmen became more and more troublesome until eventually, heartily sick of the whole business, the Saudi officials dismissed the tribesmen with a few riyals and no rifles, and closed the camp. The tribesmen, furious at being cheated, as they considered it, returned home with very definite views

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669 about the Saudi authorities and the whole affair did us more good than harm, demonstrating as it did the efficiency of our local forces and Royal Air Force ground-air co-operation and the value of a Saudi promise. Various diplomatic kettles in other parts of the world went off the boil, and I had no further trouble on the Saudi frontier.

241 Hundreds of years ago Aden
133 the value of these silt-laden seasonal floods was realised by the
312 people of the plain, and they initiated an elaborate irrigation
134 system, the remains of which exist to the present day. Years of
926 inter-tribal warfare which benefited no-one, brought the
original system to ruin and the land went out of cultivation
and the silt-laden waters rushed unimpeded headlong to the
sea to discolour the ocean for many miles.

654 Hartley started with a modest capital of £10,000 granted
312 by His Majesty's Government for the purchase of seed grain
241 and for the hiring of bullocks to build dams and till the ground;
• 648 and with this modest sum he was able to bring 700 acres under
[926] cultivation. The tribes were loath to give up what had become
their battle-field, and their silly futile squabbles interrupted
Hartley's efforts until the patience of the Aden Government
was exhausted and measures were taken to enforce security
in the area.

648 Once the World War was over, food production was no
654 longer of paramount importance, and with the economic
248 future of the area in mind long staple Egyptian cotton cultivation
178 was successfully introduced, and by an Administrative
Order of my predecessor, an organisation known as the
Abiyan Board was set up to manage the whole agricultural
project. Additional capital to the extent of £270,000 was
obtained as a loan from His Majesty's Government and there
was rapid development, so that by the time I became Governor
several thousand acres were under cotton cultivation. The
Board directed the agricultural policy of the area, was responsible
for pest control, owned and operated the heavy agricultural
machinery necessary for the economic working of the land,
owned and operated two cotton ginning factories, controlled
the distribution of flood water through the irrigation canals
and channels, and was responsible for the shipping and marketing
of the cotton crop.

648 In spite of the changed circumstances of the Board they
continued to function by virtue of the original Administrative
Order. All efforts by my predecessor to regularise the position
by persuading the Fadli and Lower Yafa States, within whose
territories Abiyan is situated, to enact decrees failed owing to

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the intransigence of the Lower Yafa State Council. I was no more successful, and towards the end of my association with Aden there arose a serious disagreement between the States and the Board.

The States had grown rich and the farmers prosperous as a result of their own hard work, and the Board's activities and guidance, and they began to think that they knew all about the cultivation of such a specialised crop as high grade cotton. The Board had grown rich also and had become a trifle domineering and, of course, it was managed by an Englishman and had a number of British employees. It was just about this time that nationalism became rampant in the Middle East and the indigestion of unaccustomed wealth from which the States were already suffering, was rendered acute by the flatulence of anti-British broadcasts from Egypt. Dissatisfaction with the goose that had laid and was laying the golden eggs became acute.

The policy of the Board was directed by a Committee 654
which functioned under the chairmanship of the British 648
Adviser and was composed of representatives of the two States, the Manager of the Board and the Director of Agriculture. Unfortunately the Board did not always pay heed to the directions of this Committee and there was no doubt that the States were not without genuine cause for some dissatisfaction. It was high time that the future organisation of the Board was considered seriously and its exact functions more clearly defined. Various schemes were considered and rejected until, at last, one was produced that my advisers and I thought would meet the rapidly changing political conditions and at the same time would regularise the Board's increasing activities outside the Abiyan area in Lahej and elsewhere, and which were no concern of the Fadli and Lower Yafa States.

The new scheme gave very considerable power to the States, but the essential right of Government to act in an emergency to prevent a breakdown due to inter-State disputes or gross mismanagement was retained. I should make it quite clear that the States had no quarrel with the Board's British employees whose value they did not underestimate and whose services they were most anxious to retain. The Fadli representative, the Sultan's Minister or Naib as he is called, was favourable to my scheme and was prepared to advise the Fadli State Council to enact the decree necessary to give it legal force in their State. Not so, however, the Lower Yafa Naib who was Sultan Muhammed with whom I had journeyed to Al Qara and who objected to power to act in an emergency being specifically assigned in the scheme to Government. He maintained that his State Council, of which he was President, would not be prepared to approve the decree necessary to bring the scheme into force in Lower Yafa. What he really meant was that he would advise the Council not to approve. I went to Abiyan personally and discussed the matter fully with both the Naibs, but I was no more successful than the British Agent had been with his considerable powers of persuasion, and Sultan Muhammed remained firmly in opposition. The only thing to do was to let the matter rest for a while and hope that time would bring about a change in the Yafa attitude.

Unfortunately time was not given much of a chance to show what wonders it could work, because the Lower Yafa Sultan, who had made over his authority in the lowland area of his State, which included the Yafa lands on the Abiyan plain to the Council, while retaining personal control of his highlands, suddenly lost his temper and clapped his son and several members of the Council into prison. Why the Sultan lost his temper has remained a mystery, and he had probably forgotten the reason himself the next morning, because he ordered the release of the prisoners and directed them to resume their various offices. He released them because it was brought to his notice that he had given me an undertaking to occupy himself exclusively with the highlands and not to interfere with his son and the Council in their conduct of affairs in the lowlands. The Council members were very cross indeed and refused to resume their functions and, led by Sultan Muhammed, most of them motored off to Lahej, leaving a void which was filled within two hours by an Assistant Adviser and a detachment of Government Guards. Swift and firm action is essential if

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disorder is to be prevented when the Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister, go away and leave their country to its own devices.

There was no trouble at all and disappointed by the result of their demonstration the Naib and his colleagues thought better of their hasty action after a few days and returned to their duty, and the Government Guards went back to Aden to await the next emergency. The atmosphere was still not conducive to calm thinking, so the negotiations about the reorganisation scheme for the Board were further delayed, while the Naib and some of the Council members prepared to form with the Fadli Naib and representatives of his Council a joint mission which, under the experienced guidance of the Director of Agriculture was being sent to London and Liverpool to discuss cotton prices and the method of disposal of the cotton crop when the Board's contract with the Raw Cotton Commission expired. It was thought that the change of air and change of scene would do everyone good, and very soon the minds of those who had not travelled to the West before were absorbed with such problems as how to button up a pair of trousers and whether the shirt went inside or outside.

Up in the highlands of Upper Yafa where the rainfall is sufficient for coffee to be grown, there is very little soil, and the hardy inhabitants have conserved every inch they can find by terracing their steep hills to their very tops. I always enjoyed flying over this country which I never reached on foot, and looking down at the mountains which, with their intricate terraces looked exactly like a geography model designed to illustrate contouring, so closely have the builders followed the natural course of the ground. The coffee produced in these hills is as fine as the so-called "Mocha" coffee of the Yemen and most of it finds its way down to Aden and from there, after being graded for quality, reaches the markets of the United Kingdom and the United States. I said so-called "Mocha" coffee because in point of fact no coffee is grown in the neighbourhood of Mocha, which is a small sea port on the Yemen coast of the Red Sea which gave its name to the coffee which was exported from there after having been brought down by

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remedy the first need was never in my hands, but the opportunity to produce some form of marketing organisation was, 241 441 and it has taken shape and should be on the way to finding new and extending old markets for the fruit and vegetables of the Protectorate. It will have to overcome the conservative [439] ideas of the Boards of Directors of Shipping Companies who prefer the more expensive Egyptian produce nicely wrapped up in pink paper to cheaper and better quality produce unwrapped. Nasser has possibly helped the Marketing Officer indirectly, and a judicious purchase of pink paper and elegant crates, for which of course they will be charged, will persuade the P. & O. S.N. Company, The Orient Line, the British India and other Shipping Companies to support a Protectorate which has so far remained loyal in the face of grave provocation. I made every effort I could personally to interest the vast purchasing power of the 22,000,000 net registered tons of shipping using Aden port every year, but I made no impression.

The primary need was undoubtedly for money, but that was 652 the one thing that was not forthcoming in sufficient quantity 648 to make any real impression. During the eighty-nine years that India was responsible for the Protectorate not one single penny was made available for any form of development or for the provision of any form of social service. Since 1928 when the Colonial Office became responsible for the 112,000 square miles and the 800,000 or so inhabitants, the average annual subvention would amount to £90,000 or 1.35*d.* per head of population. A total sum of £2,000,000 has been made available from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and no direct grant, other than the £10,000 in 1940 for food production, was made for development purposes before the inception of that fund. If the whole or the major portion of this sum could have been devoted to agricultural projects much might now have been completed which has still to be started, but the demands of the Health and the Education Services had to be considered and the improvement of communications was a major item which consumed more than half of this sum, and the amount left for agricultural development, which would

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648 bring if not plenty at least enough to the inhabitants, was
pitifully small.

871 In all rural areas education seems to be of secondary impor-
178 tance to the inhabitants and the Aden Protectorate was no
exception to this rule. In 1931 there was scarcely a school to be found worthy of the name anywhere in the Protectorate outside the towns of Lahej and Mukalla. There were Koranic teachers in most of the villages and an elementary education in Arabic for those willing to pay was available in the larger towns from private tutors or the owners of small private schools.
[652] By 1956 there were one hundred and ten Primary Boys'
[648] Schools, five Primary Girls' Schools, and in addition there
were six Intermediate Boys' Schools and one Lower Secondary School, and the States were contributing over £61,000 a year to the Protectorate Education Service while the United Kingdom contributed about £15,000. During the same year the Colony, with a population of 140,000, was spending £250,000 on their nineteen Primary Schools, ten Intermediate Schools and four Secondary Schools, including Aden College and the Technical Institute, but then they were well-to-do and it was their own money and they did not have to go cap in hand to the Treasury.

871 Still, in spite of everything, the progress was good and the
875 real problem in the Protectorate was not so much the lack
of funds to build schools as lack of staff for the schools which had been built and were planned for the future. The Colony had not sufficient good men to staff their own schools and even if men had been available it would not have been possible to pay them an attractive wage without upsetting the wage scales of other State employees and thereby disturbing seriously
[648] the economy of the smaller States. Lahej had tried to solve the
problem by importing Egyptian teachers, and they could only afford that luxury because the Egyptian Government subsidised this form of propaganda. It was not a policy that any sensible person would advocate, and I was convinced that the Sultan would one day regret bitterly that these political missionaries were ever imported.

The Quaiti State had been able to draw on the Sudan for

teachers to supplement and to train local talent and theirs was 871
a happy choice, but unfortunately when men were wanted for 875
States in the Western Protectorate no more were available. The Sudan could use every competent teacher in her own schools and was disinclined to release men for us even if they had been prepared to come, which was improbable.

The only solution was to make the most of local talent and this was done by Teacher Training Classes organised by the Director of Education in the Colony. The scheme is working well, but the demand for more and more men grows annually as that infectious disease, education, spreads rapidly through the whole of the Protectorate.

I am not writing a textbook and therefore I must keep away 743
from figures as much as possible, but a few cold and concrete 178
facts can often tell a story more clearly than pages of literary effort. This is so in the case of the Health Service. Twenty-five years ago nothing had been done and no real effort was made until after the World War. In 1956 there were five hospitals [652]
with a total of one hundred and ten beds, two of which were [648]
also Health Service Training Centres, and fifty-five Health Units or Dispensaries, as well as three Mission Clinics, and the States were spending at the rate of £28,000 a year compared with the United Kingdom contribution of £33,000 a year. I am afraid it does not sound very much, but it was in fact a tremendous advance. It sounds pitifully small when one realises that at the same time the Colony was spending £250,000 a year on their Health Service, to say nothing of the "Queen Elizabeth II" Hospital which will probably cost a million and a half pounds before it is completed. In fairness, however, it must be stated that the Colony Hospital was open to serious cases from the Protectorate just as the Aden College and Technical Institute had special facilities for Protectorate boys.

For many years the only medical assistance and treatment [648]
that the Protectorate people could obtain was from the Medical Officers of the Royal Air Force, and only then if they were close to a landing ground, and from the staff of the Keith Falconer Mission Hospital at Sheikh Othman who were always willing to travel into the Protectorate to care for the sick. Then

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178 a few years ago there came into being the Protectorate Health Service which owes much to Dr. N.L. Corkill, M.M., M.S.M., M.D., who came with me to Al Qara. Health Units have been built on standardised lines in all the States where they did not previously exist; and from money contributed by the Fadli and Lower Yafa States, a hospital has been built on the boundary between these two States in a central, though rather windswept, position reasonably easy of access to the people of the Abiyan plain. In Mukalla there is another hospital and up in the Wadi Hadhramaut are two small hospitals at Shibam and Saiyun.

759 The Health Assistants are trained in simple medicine and hygiene at the Fadli-Yafa hospital or in Mukalla and then go to one of the Health Units where, not only do they attend to surgery patients, but also tour the neighbouring villages and are responsible for reporting any outbreak of an infectious disease that may come to their notice to their headquarters in Aden or Mukalla, depending on which part of the Protectorate they are serving.

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164 Anti-malarial measures and Public Health work are also the responsibility of the Health Service and the decrease in the incidence of malaria and other mosquito and fly-borne diseases since the inception of the Service, is remarkable. At the same time and within the limits imposed by inadequate staff, attention is being paid to the general health of school children with particular emphasis on diseases of the eye. With adequate funds and personnel it would be possible if not to eliminate completely so to reduce trachoma that impaired vision and blindness from this cause would be a rarity rather than, as it still is today, all too common.

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648 Today, as in the past, the Royal Air Force is always ready to fly Medical Officers into the Protectorate to deal with casualties in inter-tribal scrimmages or to attend to the desperately ill who are beyond the reach or the capacity of the Health Assistants, and there are many tribesmen and women who owe their lives to the Royal Air Force. Stretcher cases from the remotest areas are flown to hospital in Aden and no call for help is ever unanswered because the sender was too humble or

the message was not sent through the proper channels. There is 743
none of that nonsense. Too often are we in the West inclined 648
to connect the Royal Air Force with destruction and death alone, bombing and rocketing and such-like punitive measures, but the tribesman in the Protectorate does not make that mistake. He is only too well aware of the other side of their work—the humane side—which is the least spectacular and seldom achieves the headlines in the daily papers in this country. The tribesman has seen the doctor arrive by air to tend the wounded and the sick, he has seen sick relatives borne off to hospital and he has seen food dropped from 'planes to the starving people in famine areas, and he does not always forget a kindness.

The most humanising and pacifying influence which any 491
administration can exert is to encourage the construction of 648
roads through previously inaccessible territory, and I was very keen on providing the Protectorate with as many good roads as possible, thereby following the excellent example of my predecessors and that great philanthropist Saiyid Sir Abu Bakr Al Kaff, K.B.E. who, at his own expense, to the tune of more than £1,000,000, constructed the first motor road from the Wadi Hadhramaut to Mukalla, thus linking the Wadi directly with the sea for the first time. Later, a second road was constructed farther to the east with funds provided by the Colonial Development Fund, and in the Western Protectorate the Aden-Dhala road was improved and plans made and funds earmarked to build a road from Aden to Beidha in the Yemen via Abiyan and up the great Audhali escarpment, and to improve the existing Aden-Yemen road through Lahej.

It was one thing to plan a road, to find the money for its 489
construction and carry out the actual work, but it was quite 492
another to ensure the safety of travellers along the new road. 493
A lorry can carry several tons and a camel only three hundred pounds, so that one medium-sized lorry was equivalent to more than a dozen camels. Lorries average 20 miles an hour even on a bad road and can travel continuously day and night, while the camel can only manage 2½ miles an hour, and even less when heavily laden, and has to be given adequate rest. The

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on the western side and the Sultanate of Qishen and Socotra on the eastern side, there is rather a different story to tell. The young Wahidi Sultan inherited a country riven by feuds and only recently has any real degree of security prevailed; but he is working on the right lines and has made creditable progress. In Qishen the wild tribesmen wander over their barren desert ranges and sand dunes with their camels and their goats following the all too scarce rain. Oil-survey parties have come to their country and they eye them uneasily, not knowing quite what to make of tractors and caravans, but willing enough to earn money when the opportunity offers and the work is not too strenuous. Down on the coast the Sultan's relatives in the seaboard villages play a Capulet and Montague game in their own Mahra dialect, which they alone can understand, while the Sultan himself, who is inclined to be a recluse, sits in the mountains of his island of Socotra 300 miles away across the sea off the Horn of Africa.

● 648 While these internal changes have been taking place there has been a change or development in the treaty relations of the major States with Her Majesty's Government. The fundamental agreements, the original protection treaties, have remained unchanged, but these States have entered into an additional treaty of an advisory nature. The Rulers have agreed to accept the Advice of Her Majesty's Government conveyed through the Governor in regard to matters to the benefit of their people and States, and we have undertaken to aid them, in particular, in the economic field, to the best of our ability. These "advisory" treaties are of recent origin and must not be confused, as they often are, with the basic protection treaties, all of which, with one very minor exception, were entered into between 1839 and 1914.

I have seen it suggested that some Rulers were coerced into agreeing to conclude "Advisory" agreements. Nothing could be further from the truth. They were entered into willingly and with full understanding of the obligations on both sides. I can make this statement from my personal knowledge. Far from pressure being used the reverse was the case. In one particular instance I refused to discuss the matter at all with the

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heir presumptive to an important Sultanate when approached by him. Later, when his claim to succeed his brother had been confirmed by the electoral college he re-opened the matter and a treaty was concluded.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MMI Aden MMI

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ing eager purchasers to make a satisfactory choice of a political garment and altering the model to suit their particular figure. It was just with this purpose in view that the Federation plan was conceived.

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In all the Western and Middle Eastern countries outside the Iron Curtain, with the exception of the temporary experiment in Egypt and the last remnant of the patriarchal conception in Saudi Arabia, governments are fundamentally democratic whether the head of State be designated Queen, King, or President, and Aden looks Westwards for guidance and inspiration.

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The contacts between the nineteenth-century Aden Protectorate and the West are daily becoming closer. Incessant broadcasts from London, Cairo and Aden itself, very different though they may be in their political approach, bring the modern West and modern Middle East into the remotest villages of the Protectorate. At the same time roads and landing grounds—of the latter there are at least eight with regular Civil Airline services, made possible by better security—have changed the mode of travel from the camel and the donkey to the lorry and the aeroplane and thereby greatly accelerated and increased personal contact with the outside world, and thus with people with Western ideas.

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In Aden Colony there are 38,000 Arabs from the Protectorate in close contact with a democratic form of government, many of whom exercise their voting right when elections to the Legislative and Municipal Councils take place. These people have become accustomed to a democratic system of government, not only in Aden, but also in countries in the West to which many of them travel. When they return to their Protectorate homes, which many of them do at frequent intervals, they find the old-fashioned autocratic rule of their Sheikh or Sultan irksome. They would like at home what they have become used to abroad, an ever-increasing say in the government of the country. At present these people are in the minority, but it will not be long before the wish of the few becomes the demand of the majority, and the wisest of the Protectorate Rulers are ready and willing to accept change and bow before the inevitable.

871 Another most important factor is education, that menace
178 in the East to tradition, which continues to expand in the
Protectorate with ever-increasing speed and threatens to
destroy completely the old system before something better
600 can be introduced, and all the while the oil survey parties
move to and fro. If oil is found there can be but one result. The
economic brake on political development will be releassed
and the pressure for change will increase until a really danggerous
situation has arisen unless the future has been carefully/ planned.
It is obvious, therefore, and has been for some timne, that the
present political structure is rapidly becoming oout-of-date and
cannot continue in this rapidly changing worl/d without danger
to the peace and security of the whole area. The problem was,
and still is, how best to guide political ddevelopment into more
liberal channels and, if possible, at the same time to improve
the economy of the area: the question is how to weld the
States together in a powerful, essentially democratic, political
and economic entity without disturbing more than necessary
the traditional ties between the people and their Rulers and
ourselves and both. To put it another way would be to say
how to achieve in a few short years what we in this country
have taken several hundred years to accomplish. In my view
the only answer to this difficult problem was, and is, federation
or the gradual joining together of the States into a compact
whole, due consideration being given to unequal development
in individual States.

842 I had thought about Federation long before there seemed any
648 possibility that one day I would become Governor, but I was
178 not the first person to put the idea down on paper. The credit
for this belongs to Mr. G. K. N. Trevaskis, O.B.E., the Adviser
for the Western Protectorate who drafted a scheme for
Federation while I was still full of ideas and nothing very
concrete. This scheme was discussed by me with my advisers
at length, and after alteration and amendment it went to
London as a definite proposal. It was approved by the Secretary
of State and I was authorised to explain my views to the
Rulers and obtain their reactions. Let me state here and now
that I am proud of my share in the Federation proposal, in

spite of the very free and adverse criticism by people far removed from the scene of action and out of touch with recent events in the Protectorate who do not think that it is appropriate or workable. One critic, however, was a notable exception to the general rule and he was in the closest touch; I refer to the Imam of the Yemen, who objected strongly to the scheme for a very different reason. He was afraid that it would work. 642 648 178

The plan for Federation was simple and to start with envisaged two separate federal structures, one in the West and the other in the East. There were two reasons for this decision; they were—firstly, that generally speaking the standard of administration in the East was very much more advanced than in the West, and secondly, that the Eastern States had always tended to keep to themselves and not to have very much to do with the Western States. 642 178

It was proposed that the head of both the federal structures would be the High Commissioner for the Protectorate who would also be the Governor of the Colony. There would be a Council of Rulers in each of the federal areas whose meetings, as a full Council, owing to distance and the preoccupation of members with the affairs of their own States, would probably be few and far between, but each of whom would depute three of their number to represent the full Council as a Working Committee. These Working Committees would be empowered to make decisions on behalf of their Councils and would meet at frequent intervals. It was probable that in the Eastern Federation the Working Committee of the Council of Rulers would, in fact, be the full Council, because it was considered that the Sultanate of Qishen and Socotra had not reached a degree of administrative development which would justify its immediate inclusion in the Federation. It was also proposed to leave out the small village State of Bir Ali because it was really too insignificant to be worthy of serious consideration.

After this novel feature of a Council of Rulers for each area, the pattern became more normal with Executive and Legislative Councils in each federal area whose members would

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be nominated in the first instance. It was realised that eventually the members of the Legislative Councils would be elected, but when precisely that major step forward would be justified would depend on a number of things, not the least of which would be the degree of responsibility shown by the members themselves.

In the beginning it was the intention to make the Federal Authorities responsible only for customs, communications, education and public health; services which lent themselves to central control and which were, with the exception of customs, already subject to a certain degree of direction by advice. It was not intended at this juncture that the Federal Authorities would interfere in any other way with the independent internal authority of the States. When the Federations became firmly established and the advantages of federal control more generally understood, more and more subjects would be transferred to federal control. It was to be a gradual process.

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The Protectorate is a deficit area and, excluding the cost of defence services, costs the British taxpayer about £800,000 a year. This sum includes, among other things, the cost of the Government Guards and the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion and subventions to States to help them maintain their own internal security forces and in certain cases to aid them with the development of State Administrations. It is not really a very large sum being probably less than one pound her head of population a year, but it was clearly undesirable to increase the British taxpayer's burden unnecessarily. Therefore, the financing of the federal scheme was of primary importance. The centralisation of the customs service was an economic measure which would result not only in a saving in administrative and collection costs, but would make practicable the levy of import and export dues on goods entering and leaving the Protectorate. The saving in administrative cost is obvious when it is realised that one reasonably efficient centrally controlled organisation would replace twenty-five separate organisations, only three or four of which could be described as reasonably efficient. The object of the exercise was not to deprive individual States of their principal source of income and bring them even closer

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to bankruptcy than they were already, but to provide, by saving on administration costs and by levying a realistic export duty on cotton lint, an income sufficient to pay for the Federal Authorities and for subventions to the States to compensate them for their loss of customs revenue. Careful examination of the details of the scheme proved conclusively that it was a practical proposition. At the present time all tobacco, cigarettes and petroleum products imported into the Colony and subsequently exported by land to the Protectorate pay full Colony duty or excise and no drawback is granted. Once the Federal Authorities had been established there was no practical reason why the Colony should not be asked to grant a customs drawback on goods subject to Colony taxation re-exported by land to the Protectorate. This would enable the Federal Authorities to impose their own import duty and increase their revenue without the consumers being adversely affected. [651]

One further question which required consideration was where the Councils should meet. At least one previous attempt to bring the Western Protectorate States into closer relationship had failed because the meetings between the Rulers had been held in the State of the then most important and advanced Ruler. Prestige and jealousy reared their ugly heads in no time. I did not intend that that mistake should again be made. The obvious place for the Western Federation was the Colony, at any rate, in the beginning until something in the nature of a Canberra could be agreed upon, or brought into being, where accommodation for meetings and for the delegates was available and where inter-State jealousy would be avoided. In the Eastern Protectorate the meetings would have to take place in Mukalla in spite of the very real drawback occasioned by the smaller States' fear of Quaiti domination. There was no alternative; the Colony was too far away even with the improved communications.

This then was, in brief outline, the Federation scheme which was laid before the Rulers at Government House in January 1954. The meeting was well attended by the Western Protectorate Rulers whose only absentees of note were the Haushabi Sultan, always a trifle weird, who was having a dispute with 642

642 his neighbour Lahej, and the eccentric Awd bin Saleh, the Upper Aulaki Sultan who could not, at that time, be induced to leave his house in Nisab. Of the Eastern Rulers the Quaiti Sultan was too infirm to attend and the Sultan of Qishen and Socotra was miles away in Socotra. The Resident Adviser in Mukalla had already discussed the scheme in principle with the Quaiti Sultan and found that he was favourably inclined to the proposal.

All the Rulers present at the meeting accepted the scheme in principle, that is the principle of Federation, but very sensibly and rightly they decided that they could not make any pronouncement on the details of the plan until they had had time to study it and if necessary discuss it with their advisers. I was at pains to make it quite clear to them that the present plan was really nothing more than a blueprint. They were the people who were prepared to build the house and I and my officers were the architects and it was our business to meet their wishes in regard to design in so far as it was possible to do so without jeopardising the stability of the whole structure. Negotiations with individual Rulers were started shortly afterwards and initially good progress was made. Some of the States were prepared to accept the plan without alteration, while others asked for only minor and reasonable amendments. At first the prospects were bright for early general agreement, but as the year 1954 advanced so did my hopes recede.

642 As was anticipated the Yemen reaction was very unfavour-
● 648 able, but I confess I had not expected the Egyptian reaction to be as violent as it was, although the Suez Canal controversy was at its height. They condemned the scheme because it was British and for no other reason, and their radio broadcasts talked of the enslavement of the people and their Rulers and branded the Rulers, who were known to be favourably disposed, as traitors to their country and religion and the friends of infidels. Individual Rulers were mentioned by name and the faint-hearted began to hedge and counsel a postponement until the atmosphere was more conducive to calm consideration.

The Arab League produced a mission which, led by the

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Secretary-General, hurried to the Yemen to consult the Imam. The Yemen was a member of the League so, although the members of the mission, who were intelligent men, were by no means favourably impressed by the Imam's arguments, they felt that they must give him their support. The mission came to see me in Aden and I said I could not understand how they could favour general Federation of the Arab countries, which was then their declared policy, and at the same time condemn the application of the same principles to the Arab States of the Aden Protectorate. We had an amusing talk but did not achieve anything worth while.

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A further set-back came when suggestions were made outside Aden that the States were being forced into the Federation. These suggestions were not taken lightly by any means, although they were quite without foundation in fact. No force was used and no attempt was made to coerce the Rulers who were free to put forward their amendments to the plan, or even to remain outside the Federation altogether if they believed it was to the advantage of their States to do so. In retrospect I think it would have been wiser and to the advantage of the Protectorate as a whole, if the weaklings had been coerced and the Federation become an accomplished fact in 1954. As it was there was a change of policy on our part and the negotiations with the States were discontinued and in order that there could be no possible foundation for any suggestion of force, the proposal was left in abeyance pending a move by the Rulers themselves. So much for the Western States where matters were to rest at this stage for nearly eighteen months.

Meanwhile in the Eastern area, the plan was badly damaged in launching and had to be rebuilt almost from the keel upwards. The Wahidi Sultan, who had declared in favour of federation with the Quaiti and the Kathiri States, wavered and had second thoughts and preferred to federate with the Western States, being somewhat apprehensive of his Quaiti neighbour. Then he had another change of heart or of mind and decided that he would not federate with anyone for the time being. The Wahidi's withdrawal upset the balance in the East, and the Kathiri Sultan whose State is surrounded by Quaiti

CHAPTER TEN

Yemen Relations and the 1955 Revolt

THE general trend of our relations with the Yemen must be clear to anyone who has read as far as this, and I do not propose to do more at this final stage than to summarise generally and to try at the same time to remove any misunderstanding which may have arisen.

The federation plan was not the fundamental reason, as the critics of that plan have sometimes suggested, for the disturbed state of our relations with the Yemen. Long before I came to serve in Aden we were on bad terms with the Yemen, in fact, from the time that we entered into treaty relations with the Protectorate States and by so doing became their champion and protector. In 1928, in particular, our relations were strained almost to breaking point, with the Yemen in occupation of the Dhala plateau as well as half the Audhali Sultan's territory. After the 1934 Treaty was signed there was a brief improvement, but gradually the frontier position deteriorated again. In 1948, when the revolution in the Yemen in that year occupied the minds of the ruling family and their rivals to the exclusion of all else, there was, for a few months, peace all along the frontier line. This respite was of short duration and no sooner had the new Imam, Ahmad, secured his throne than the old animosity was resumed with renewed vigour and added bitterness, and in 1952 I was constrained to represent to His Majesty's Government, with all the force at my command, how provocative had grown the Imam's attitude and how disturbed I was at the increased frequency and magnitude of the frontier incidents which were entirely Yemeni inspired.

I do not pretend for one moment that the federation plan did not contribute to a worsening of our already bad relations with the Yemen. There is no doubt that it did. The Imam was alarmed when he saw the scheme accepted in principle by the majority of the Rulers and he expected that practical results would follow the acceptance of the scheme and he visualised the Protectorate becoming, in a very short time, a powerful consolidated country well beyond his grasp and particularly attractive to the Sha'afi majority in his own country. He feared a move on their part to join the Protectorate Federation and saw himself and his Zeidis isolated in the hills of the Northern Yemen and cut off from access to the sea. The Imam said as much to the Secretary-General of the Arab League when he received their mission in Taiz, and his half-brother, His Royal Highness Saif al Islam Abdullah, who was then Foreign Minister, said the same thing to me in 1954 when I went to Taiz to try and improve, by personal contact, Anglo-Yemen relations. I nearly succeeded, but that is another story. The Imam's fear was, of course, quite unjustified because we are precluded by the Treaty of 1934 from any unfriendly act, which a favourable reaction to a Yemeni Sha'afi approach would be, and we still have old-fashioned ideas about the sanctity of Treaties with Foreign Powers. Although I was able to convince the Foreign Minister of our good faith, I made little impression on the great man himself.

The Imam has seen our withdrawal from India, Burma, Ceylon and the Sudan and he is convinced that we will leave Arabia with our task uncompleted and the declaration to the contrary which I made to him personally in Taiz in 1954, which had been made before and has since been made by Ministers of the Crown in London and Aden, did nothing to alter this conviction. Provided, therefore, he can keep the Protectorate undeveloped, economically and socially, and disintegrated politically he feels that he will have no difficulty in stepping into our shoes when the time comes. To this end he maintains his claim to the whole of the Protectorate and the Colony and will hinder to the best of his ability any attempt by us to integrate the States or to develop them socially and economically. As the Qadhi Muhammed Abdullah Ash Shami said on

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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one occasion to our Frontier Office during the course of a conversation on frontier relations, "The more uncivilised the Protectorate, the less trouble we shall have when we take over."

Our policy is simply re-stated. It is to carry out our obligations to the States of the Protectorate and to maintain friendly relations with the Yemen. It is an admirable one in theory but in the face of the attitude of the present regime in the Yemen well nigh impossible to put into practice. Our primary duty cannot be in doubt: it is to the Rulers and peoples of the Protectorate.

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I cannot leave the subject of the Yemen without giving a short account of the 1955 revolution in that country which, although it had but a temporary effect on our relations with that country, gives an interesting indication of the internal stresses and strains to which the Yemen is subject. The revolution was in part attributable to the Imam's action in 1954 when he declared his son Badr to be the heir apparent and thereby disturbed seriously certain elements in his own family, and in part to his continued harsh treatment of his Sha'afi subjects. The revolt was a curious affair, ill conceived and badly executed. The figurehead was the Imam's half-brother, Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, who though not a very competent Foreign Minister was a pleasant personality and had travelled widely in the Middle East, Europe and the United States of America. I had entertained him in Aden and had conducted the 1954 negotiations with him in Taiz and I know that the final and dramatic break-down of those negotiations was as disappointing to him as it was to me. He was genuine in his wish to see better relations between our two countries and was far more realistic and broadminded in his attitude to the Protectorate than the Imam.

The revolution started well, from the point of view of the rebels, and Abdullah seized control of Taiz, the *de facto* capital, and imprisoned the Imam in the Old Guest House, where I had stayed on my first visit to the Yemen in 1934, opposite to the Foreign Ministry which was, not unnaturally, the revolutionary headquarters. The plan seems to have been to seize the person of the Imam who would then be persuaded to abdicate

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
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old appointment in Beidha with enhanced authority and the empty title of Minister of State.

The revolution was over. The Imam had lost two more brothers and the blood letting had cooled temporarily the fevered Yemen. Anglo-Yemen relations returned to the normal pitch of strain within a few weeks and I was at the airport in Aden to welcome His Royal Highness Saif al Islam Hassan, the Imam's eldest brother and Prime Minister of the Yemen, who was on his way by air from Cairo to attend the Bandung Conference. Although Hassan had been a tower of strength to his brother during the 1948 rebellion, he had never been on really friendly terms with him and their relations had become distinctly strained after the recognition of Badr as Crown Prince. He had been in Cairo during the recent revolt and his part, if any, in that affair has never been made clear, but shortly after Bandung he was relieved of his office of Prime Minister and sent to New York to represent the Yemen at the United Nations. He has never been back to his own country where his sons are still kept under surveillance.

Aden
This figure does not include

● 648 652 178 the £4,000,000 which was obtained from Her Majesty's Government in the form of an Exchequer Loan at 4½ per cent. for thirty years, to provide administration services and roads at Bureikha, services necessitated by the £45,000,000 Refinery and the £7,000,000 harbour with alongside berths for the great crude oil tankers completed by the B.P. Company in 1953. The finance for Colony development has been found from local Aden Government resources to the extent of £5,000,000 and a further £1,300,000 has been raised on the London Market, while the British Government has contributed £450,000 and a further £150,000 has been earmarked for a specific item, from the Exchequer Loan. The balance required to complete the programme amounts to some £3,000,000 and it is proposed, under the Development Plan, to raise a further loan of £3,500,000 in London.

652 178 [871] I give these figures, not because I have the least desire to compile anything in the nature of a statistical account, but because they give in brief a clear indication of the expansion economically of the Colony in the short period of less than twenty years. I have already given figures showing the tremendous advance in education over the same period, which is of particular significance when it is realised that those figures are ninety per cent. Arab, as most of the children of the minority communities attend schools which are under unofficial control although they receive very substantial annual subsidies from the Aden Government.

000 The stage is set and the prologue is spoken by Sir Muhammed Mackawwi—he was knighted in 1949 for his great public service to his country—one Saturday evening in August 1951, as he and I were sitting on the roof of his garden house at Sheikh Othman. We had dined together and were drinking our coffee and enjoying the cool night breeze after the humid heat of a rather still day for that time of the year. Suddenly he startled me by saying:

"I am not sure that we are ready for democracy in Aden, not, that is, for democratic Government, and yet in some ways we Arabs are more democratic, truly democratic, than are you British."

The Legislative Council was enlarged slightly at the same time so that it consisted of nine *ex-officio* and nominated Official members, four Unofficial members elected by the electoral divisions of the Colony, one Unofficial member elected from among and by the members of the Municipal Committee, thus encouraging young men to work in that sphere and at the same time ensuring a proper representation of municipal interest, and four nominated Unofficial members. Of the nominated Unofficial members one was required by the Constitution to represent business interests and the others represented minority communities, or were persons whose wise counsel was of great value to the Chamber. Nine on each side of the Chamber, with the Governor presiding, there was thus a slender, very slender Government majority. 646

An analysis of the members showed that the Council consisted of eleven Europeans, two of them on the unofficial side, five Arabs, one Somali and one Indian. The fact that there were so many Europeans had no particular significance because there was no reason why a number of the Departmental Heads on the official side should not, in time, be local men. On the unofficial side the European who represented trading interests was the President of the Chamber of Commerce, an appointment which may well be filled at a not too distant date by a non-European, though it will always have to be borne in mind that the considerable trading interests of the European business houses must have adequate representation.

At the same time as I informed the Legislative Council that changes in their constitution were contemplated, I was able to tell them that that very day the Executive Council had been strengthened by the addition of an Arab Unofficial member. Since then a further addition to the Executive Council has taken place and there were by the end of 1956 two Arab unofficial members as well as the one European Unofficial member. There had always been a European Unofficial member on the Council since the inception of the Executive Council in 1937. 645 [642]

In the spring of 1956 there was a clamour in the Press for further constitutional advance, uninstructed clamour largely 642 648

642 648 induced by political developments in other Colonies and to some extent the disagreeable radio broadcasts from Egypt. A firm line was clearly necessary and it was time that a statement of policy should be made so that everyone knew precisely where he stood. This was done by Lord Lloyd, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. He came out to Aden and British Somaliland on an official tour and, at my invitation, he addressed the Legislative Council, and in effect said that there was not going to be any change during the life of the present Council, that is, before the end of 1958, and that it would not be reasonable or sensible, or in the interests of the inhabitants of the Colony, for them to aspire in the foreseeable future to anything beyond a considerable degree of self-government. The clamour died down gradually and the majority of the Colony papers began to have a much more sensible approach to the political future of the Colony.

668 Lord Lloyd's visit was not without incident and was made the occasion for a political demonstration. On the afternoon of his arrival a number of members of the political extremist Party, the National United Front, whose political platform was full self-government tomorrow or even sooner, had collected at the Airport with the intention of demonstrating. They were persons of no consequence and in a number of cases of dubious character. Some of them carried walking sticks and others had banners on which were written nationalistic slogans. They had arrived just before I did, and the Commissioner of Police asked me whether he should disperse them. There was no doubt about his ability to do so if I had considered it desirable, but my answer was that they could remain provided they did not transgress the law in any way. The 'plane bringing Lord Lloyd had just touched down, and after this short conversation with the Commissioner, I walked across the tarmac to meet him and asked him whether he would prefer to avoid the unofficial reception committee by driving out through the Royal Air Force entrance to the landing ground some half mile or so down the runway. He asked me what I thought. I said I did not see why we should be put off by these ragamuffins. He was in complete agreement. We departed through a crowd

2: Hickinbotham G-4, ɔ (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

From the "Upper Circle" 1958

000 TWO years have passed since I left Aden and ceased to take an active part in the South Arabian drama, and much has happened in the Middle East in that comparatively short space of time. I feel, therefore, that this work would not be complete if I did not refer briefly to major events which have directly and indirectly had their effect on both the Colony and the Protectorate. I do so as a spectator far removed from the Arabian stage, and in consequence I may have missed some of the finer points, but the general theme of the play has not been too difficult to follow.

829 This is neither the place nor the time to examine the pros and cons of the action taken by the British Government in conjunction with the French Government following on the seizure in 1956 of the Suez Canal by President Nasser of Egypt. It is the effect of that action on the people of Aden with which I am concerned. At first the landing at Suez surprised and bewildered moderates and extremists in the Colony alike, but when the initial shock had worn off the moderates voiced their disapproval in reasonable language and the extremists made the most of the aggression aspect of the affair and condemned the, to their way of thinking, unprovoked attack upon an Arab country. There were those, but they were very few, who were prepared to say plainly that they hoped our action would result in the downfall of Nasser. But whatever may have been said in public there were many who in private desired our success, though they could not approve the method we had employed.

441 The trading community was gravely disturbed, not so much
434 by the possible political consequences of Suez, but by the

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actual effect the closure of the Canal must have on their own 434
business interests. Events showed that they had good reason 182
to be concerned. Shipping fell away rapidly. The monthly 648
average of ships entering the port of Aden for the six months 505
prior to the crisis, that is, from May to October 1956, was 454. In November only 277 ships used the port, and by February 1957 the number was down to 93, the lowest point to be reached. Business throughout the Colony was similarly affected and the trade with passengers, on which the merchants of Steamer Point depend for their livelihood, virtually ceased as all passenger ships were diverted round the Cape.

The finances of the Colony were dealt a blow from which they have yet to recover and behind the immediate and, it was hoped, temporary dislocation of trade, there lurked the fear that the major Shipping Companies having once become accustomed to routing their ships by the Cape to Australia and the Far East, would continue to do so even when the Canal was open once again to world shipping. Mercifully for the Government of Aden and the trading community and all who depended upon them and the port for their living this fear proved to be groundless. Once the Canal was cleared and reopened the volume of shipping returned to normal much earlier than had been expected by the most optimistic.

The bright side of the picture was that in spite of the diver- 648
gence of views over Suez, personal relations between Govern- 208
ment officials and their Arab friends remained unimpaired. At 204
the same time the example of moderation shown by the local 829
Press, in particular in the English language, was one which even the newspapers in the United Kingdom would have done well to have followed. All newspapers in Aden are Arab or Indian-owned and the two main English language papers are both Arab owned and Arab edited. All the more commendable, therefore, was their restraint during this most difficult period.

In the Protectorate the reaction was somewhat different. 829
There was satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government had, at last, shown that they were capable of strong and determined action and with it was born a hope in the hearts of the Rulers on the Yemen frontier that it would be the turn of that country

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1 ●
Yemen ML1

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and this manifestation of Arab unity and progress was certainly 829 not unwelcome to the public. Some there were who felt that the unusual union would not stand the test of time, but the anti-Communist aspect of the move made a general appeal. The Arab Muslim has a profound dislike of Communism, a creed, if it can be so described, fundamentally opposed to the teaching of Islam.

In the Protectorate the new Republic was viewed with little enthusiasm by the Rulers of the Western section of the Protectorate who were alive to the possibility of the Yemen becoming a partner in the union in spite of her monarchial system of government. They knew full well that the Imam's sole object in joining would be to secure Egyptian assistance in his almost open war against the Protectorate. The Crown Prince of the Yemen might have other and possibly more high-minded motives in wooing the Egyptians, but not so his father whose thoughts were concentrated on the furtherance of his claims Y to the Protectorate. A

The fears of the Rulers were fully justified. No sooner had 648 ● the Yemen, already strengthened with arms from behind the 721 Iron Curtain, joined the United Arab Republic than the disturbances on the Aden-Yemen frontier were intensified and Communist arms and Egyptian and Russian instructors aggravated an already dangerous situation. Y

There is no doubt that the possession of automatic weapons [411] and artillery by the Yemen has put a much more serious aspect on the acts of aggression which the Government of that country continues to initiate against the Protectorate, and the Protectorate Rulers most closely affected have been outspoken in their condemnation of the Yemen and in their demand that Her Majesty's Government fulfil her treaty Y pledges and take immediate action to prevent further aggression. A Theirs is a very natural reaction, and it would seem that at long last a stronger line is to be taken with the Yemen. In 648 May of this year the Royal Air Force carried out a successful 626 attack on Yemen gun positions near the town of Qataba in the Yemen. These guns had been shelling British forces well within Protectorate limits in the Dhala Amirate. Nothing could have 000

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1 •
2 Yemen ML1

000 been more justified than this air attack which heartened our
friends as much as it dismayed their enemies.

Yet while it would be dangerous to underestimate the gravity
of the situation on the Aden-Yemen frontier, it would be most
unwise to lose a proper sense of proportion and exaggerate
unduly the magnitude of the operations which have so far
taken place. Operations which had they occurred between the
two World Wars on the north-west frontier of India would
have received but the most cursory attention from the Press
of this country. Nor must we disregard the internal condition
Y of the Yemen which must cause the Imam greater worry than
669 does that of the Protectorate the Governor of Aden. Only
recently has there been a disturbance in the neighbourhood of
Sana which the Imam is reported to have suppressed with his
usual vigour and that lonely man, who can place his trust in so
few, must realise how grave are the risks of serious internal
strife in his country which may result in his death or deriving
Y from his death.

648 Arms and ammunition are not the only things that the Yemen
411 has obtained from Russia and her satellites. Money and tech-
504 nicians for the development of the port at Hodeidah have been
439 provided, and rumour has linked Russia and Egypt with the
alleged building of a submarine base farther south and the
fortification of Sheikh Said overlooking the island of Perim
which is part of the Colony of Aden. Hodeidah will cost a
tremendous amount to develop into a safe harbour, and when
this has been done it will be years before there will be sufficient
trade to attract shipping in any quantity. Even though a port
is on a main trade route, shipowners will not put their vessels
in unless there are very substantial attractions such as cargo
A in quantities or, as at Aden, cheap bunkers.

Y It will be a long time, if ever, before Aden need fear a serious
504 set-back from Hodeidah's competition, though undoubtedly
• 648 some of the present coastal trade will be affected and the land
694 route from Aden to Taiz may feel the effect when the new road
from Taiz to Hodeidah is completed.

Y Sheikh Said may have been fortified to the extent of a
712 battery or so of guns, but their only value is in their effect

276 It[1] is expensive and Aden
435 it has been calculated that Qāt costs the addicts in the Colony £2,500,000 a year.

276 The Unofficial Members were not concerned primarily
434 with the effect of the drug on the constitutions of the addicts, but with the economic aspect of the problem. The majority of those who use Qāt are in the lower wage brackets and cannot really afford to buy Qāt without seriously neglecting their
• 648 family responsibilities. After much careful thought the Asiatic
671 Unofficial Members tabled a motion in the Legislative Council at the beginning of 1957 calling on the Aden Government to take action to prohibit the entry of Qāt into the Colony. The motion was not opposed and in due course action was taken
548 and Qāt was prohibited. However, the Aden Government has
648 no control over the States of the Protectorate and the Sultan of Lahej, through whose territory Qāt from the Yemen and from Dhala must pass to reach the Colony, was unwilling to co-operate with the Aden Authorities. Not only did he place no restriction on the movement of Yemen and Dhala Qāt through his territory but he allowed Qāt from Ethiopia, brought by launch and sailing craft from Djibouti in French Somaliland to which place it had been flown from Ethiopia, to be landed on his coast and taken to Dar Saad on the Colony boundary and other places in his territory. The immediate consequence of the Sultan's action was to turn the village of Dar Saad into one vast Qāt chewing den to which resorted all the citizens of Aden who used the stuff and could afford the transport. Why the Sultan did this dis-service to the Colony is hard to say. He may have been unwilling to annoy the Yemen Government, fearing retaliation along his frontier with that country, or he may have thought that action by him to prohibit Qāt from passing through his territory would result in the Imam closing the frontier, as he has done on more than one occasion in the past, with a consequent loss of revenue to the State from road tolls. On the other hand, he may have felt that the order of prohibition was an unjustified infringement of the liberty of the subject to which he could not subscribe, and was not prepared therefore to do anything to interrupt the supply from any source. Whatever were his reasons the result

[1] [i.e., Qāt, -Analyst]

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of his refusal to co-operate was to make nonsense of the Aden 648 •
Government prohibition order.

Four months after the ban was imposed some of the Asiatic 548
Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council had second
thoughts and introduced a Motion in the Council to set up a 648
Commission to inquire into the effectiveness of the ban and 671
make a recommendation whether or not it should continue in force. The Commission was duly appointed and has recently produced its recommendations after hearing and receiving evidence from all conditions of people. They have recommended that the prohibition order be rescinded. Personally I regret their decision. I would have preferred to see the ban remain in force with some provision for the supply of limited and diminishing quantities of Qāt to confirmed addicts whose health would be adversely affected by total deprivation. I am sure that the Commission considered this solution but there were probably practical difficulties.

In May of this year following on two bomb-throwing 579
incidents in which twelve people were injured in one of the main centres of population in the Colony, the Governor declared a state of emergency. The purpose of the Governor's proclamation was to provide the police with additional powers under emergency regulations to prevent such acts of violence and to protect the lives and property of the public. Since the declaration of a state of emergency there have been several further incidents; mostly of no consequence, but one, an attempt, fortunately unsuccessful, to blow up the oil pipe-line connecting the Refinery at Bureikha with the bunkering installation at Steamer Point, was more serious. This is indeed a sorry state of affairs and the firm action of the Authorities is more than justified. It is to be hoped that they will have the full co-operation of the public in their efforts to prevent further outrages and to bring the perpetrators of those that have taken place to justice. I have no doubt that the inspiration for these crimes came from outside the Colony and, indeed, outside the Protectorate, though the tools may have been found nearer at hand. I am convinced that this is the work of hired assassins and I should be very surprised to learn that any

6;Gt. Brit., Colonial Office G-3 (1948) 1950 MMI Aden

000 of the Red Sea route and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 regained
161 for Aden its old importance. As a result of the increased prosperity of Aden since British occupation, the civil population excluding military has
430 risen from 500 to 80,516 (according to the census taken in October, 1946). The modern commercial prosperity of Aden is based on the fact that it
504 is a fuelling-station, originally for coal, and now for coal and oil. It is nearer than any other large port on the main eastern trade route to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's production centre in the Persian Gulf. The fact that ships call at Aden for fuelling has caused general increase in trade, and it is the distributing centre for trade to and from Arabia, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Africa.

631 Perim Island was first occupied by the French in 1738. In 1799 the British took formal possession, but evacuated the island in the same year.
635 It was later reoccupied by the British in January, 1857, and placed under the control of an Assistant Political Resident at Aden. In 1929 the Manager of the Perim Coal Company was appointed Government Agent, but, on the closing down of that Company in October, 1936, the Commissioner of Police, Aden, was appointed Administrator of the island. A police detachment is maintained at Perim, and the Administrator makes regular visits from Aden, usually by air.

Chapter 3 : Administration

648 Since 1937, when the territory was taken from the control of the Govern-
648 ment of India and put under the Colonial Office, the constitution of Aden has been that of a Crown Colony. The Colony is administered by a
645 Governor, assisted by an Executive Council.

Under the royal instructions, the Executive Council of the Colony consists of the officers lawfully discharging the functions of Chief Secretary, of Attorney General and of Financial Secretary and such other persons as may from time to time be appointed by His Majesty by any instructions or warrants under his sign manual and signet, or as the Governor may, by an instrument under the public seal of the Colony, appoint in pursuance of instructions from His Majesty through one of his principal Secretaries of State, or as the Governor may provisionally appoint in the manner provided in the royal instructions.

Whenever upon any special occasion the Governor desires to obtain the advice of any person within the Colony relating to affairs therein, he may summon such person, for such special occasions, as an Extraordinary Member of the Council.

646 Under the provisions of the Aden Colony (Amendment) Order, 1944, a Legislative Council was constituted for the Colony of Aden. The Council was inaugurated in January, 1947, and consists of the Governor as President, 4 *ex-officio* members, not more than 4 official members, and not more than 8 unofficial members. A list of members of the Executive and Legislative Councils is attached as Appendix I.

563 fallen below Indians in numbers and influence. There has thus been a temptation for the less responsible sections of the Arab press to transfer to Indians the animosity previously stirred up against the Jews as an alien and wealthy race, extorting inflated profits from the poor ignorant Arab.

648 The feeling of solidarity between Arabs and Pakistanis has been demonstrated on the visits of H.M. Pakistani ships of war. At the same time it must be placed on record that British and Indian ships have been given most cordial receptions.

691 Some constitutional advance was made by the reduction of the property qualifications for electors to the Township Authority of Fortress, and the introduction of an income qualification, which increased the number of voters from 1,600 to 5,000. The next election will be held in March, 1951.

647 746 Social work has been helped by the formation of a Social Welfare Advisory Council, which includes unofficial representatives of all races, and a Labour Advisory Board, also with substantial unofficial representation, has been set up.

362 The shortage of housing remains one of the most important problems facing Government. Some [illegible] working-class houses have been built by Government at Sheikh Othman, but these replace insanitary mat houses which were destroyed as the new buildings became available, and do not provide additional accommodation; it is estimated that at least 2,000 new houses are needed. The Government is examining new methods of cheap and rapid construction, and seeking means of financing a substantial housing programme from Government or private funds.

643 His Excellency Sir Reginald Champion, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., proceeded on leave prior to retirement in October, 1950. He served in Aden from 1928 to 1934; he was appointed Chief Secretary in 1942 and Governor in 1944.

000 Visitors to Aden included Mr. Bevin and Mr. Creech Jones, who called briefly in transit, and Sir T. Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary of State who made a comprehensive tour of the Colony and Protectorate.

DEVELOPMENT

652 The finances of the Colony continue in a healthy condition and revenue remains buoyant. The financial year 1949-50 ended with a deficit of Rs. 10 lakhs compared with an estimated deficit of nearly Rs. 40 lakhs. Expenditure exceeded the estimate by over Rs. 6 lakhs and revenue was up by over Rs. 36 lakhs. Unfortunately it was not possible to carry out the full programme under the development plan, and expenditure on capital works fell short of that programme by Rs. 22 lakhs. The excess of expenditure over the estimate was due mainly to extraordinary expenditure on revision of salaries and rehabilitation loans, all of which were paid during 1949-50. On the other hand, the Colony's surplus balances were written down by over Rs. 20 lakhs owing to the sharp fall in the value of investments at the end of the

T: Gt. Brit., Colonial Office G-3 (1949-50) 1951 MM1 Aden MM1
Hadhramaut MM2

H 172 A subsidiary excavation was carried out on the smaller mound of Hagr Bin Humeid, nine miles south of Timna, for the purpose of establishing a pottery sequence.

The objects found were divided between the expedition and the Amir of Beihan, and the latter's share will be exhibited in the Aden Museum on loan in due course.

The expedition returned for a further season's work in December, 1950.

H 172-173 A brief account of the first season's work has been published by Prof. W. F. Albright under the title of "The Chronology of Ancient South Arabia in the Light of the First Campaign of Excavation in Qataban" in the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, No. 119.

Chapter 13: The British Council

A 648 In spite of the fact that the number of United Kingdom appointed staff has been cut from three to one, the work of the British Institute, both men's and women's branches, has continued, and membership has increased to over 400 men and over 200 women. Lectures have been given on a variety of subjects, and the sporting and social activities of the Institute have been developed. Affiliated societies have included the Aden Discussion Group and the Aden Arts Club.

The British Council Library, which contains over 7,000 volumes, has retained its popularity. A scheme for providing boxes of books to readers living outside the range of the main library has been inaugurated. A large number of periodicals have been made available.

Extra-mural activities have been carried on in various parts of the Colony. As it is not easy for those who live outside Crater to attend British Institute functions, lectures have been given, films shown, and discussions held about life in Britain on the premises of local societies and clubs of non-political character. Unfortunately, owing to the shortage of staff, it has not been possible to extend this service as much as had been hoped.

With the object of enabling the ordinary citizens of Aden to meet their counterparts in Britain, an electrician, a fisherman, an Assistant Political Officer, a printer, and a telephone engineer visited Britain during 1949 and 1950 on British Council bursaries.

8:Gt. Brit., Colonial Office G-3 (1951-52)1954 MMI Aden NMI

from local Arab women who observed purdah and were, therefore, 165 able to gain easy access to the homes of others who also observed the purdah system.

The maternal mortality rate fell from 3.07 per 1,000 live and still-births in 1951 to 2.23 per 1,000 in 1952.

Diseases

Diseases attributable to water-borne infection were entirely absent 164 because the water supply is protected and chlorinated. The cases of enteric fever or dysentery which do occur are of a sporadic nature, many of them having been infected outside the Colony.

The death rate from pulmonary tuberculosis showed a steady 165 decline over previous years. In 1950 the death rate was recorded as 113 per 100,000 of the population ; in 1951 100 per 100,000 ; in 1952 84 per 100,000. During 1952 the World Health Organisation sent an 648 international team, comprising one medical officer and one nurse, to 744 carry out tuberculin testing of the local population below the age of 18 and to inoculate all non-reactors with B.C.G. vaccine. The team stayed in Aden for four months and tested approximately 31,000 people, of whom 7,750 non-reactors were vaccinated, approximately 14,000 were positive reactors and 8,000 or so persons failed to reappear for inspection. It is hoped to follow this visit up by asking the World Health Organisation to undertake a tuberculosis survey of the Colony.

The Colony remained free from malaria and the Aedes index fell to 164 the lowest yet recorded figure of 0.007.

The principal causes of mortality in 1951 were :

Diarrhoea and enteritis	304
Other fevers	266
Senility	171
Pneumonia and broncho-pneumonia	147
Tuberculosis of the respiratory system	100
Congenital malformations and diseases peculiar to first year of life	94
Diseases of the heart	62
Violent or accidental deaths	66
Other diseases of the respiratory system	48

Modern treatment for these diseases is given by the Civil Hospital 743 (350 beds) and the Church of Scotland Mission (80 beds) and, when required, generous assistance is provided by the R.A.F. medical officers stationed in Aden, both in consultative and specialist capacities. Steps have been taken to introduce the international statistical classification of diseases, injuries and causes of death so that closer comparison can be made with other countries.

Prevention of the diseases listed above follows the usually accepted 744 procedures but special emphasis is placed on a purified water supply, high standard of sanitation and the necessity for legislation to control itinerant vendors of foodstuffs. Milk, either goat's or cow's, is usually boiled before use and does not constitute a grave danger in the spread of disease.

8:Gt. Brit., Colonial Office G-3 (1951-52)1954 MM1 Aden MM1

respect of injury to third parties. This legislation is similar to that 494 which has existed in the United Kingdom for many years.

The Medical Practitioners (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 8 of 1952), 759 which made it an offence for a person to practice medicine in the Colony unless registered under the Ordinance. It has also deleted the provision under which the practice of native systems was permitted, since treatment by qualified practitioners is now available in the Colony.

The Ordinance also made provision for the control of the sale and [278] publication of advertisements of cures.

The Distribution of German Enemy Property Ordinance (No. 9 of 648 1952), which was based on the Distribution of German Enemy Property 425 Act, 1949, of the United Kingdom, and which made local provision for the collection, realisation and distribution of property in the Colony which belonged to German owners on 3rd September, 1939. It provided that creditors in the Colony should have a first charge on such assets in Aden.

The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Amendment) Ordinance 231 (No. 12 of 1952), which prohibited the carriage or conveyance of animals in such a manner as to cause them unnecessary suffering. It also enabled rules to be made to regulate the conditions under which animals should be carried by sea.

The Press and Registration of Books (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 204 14 of 1952), which made it obligatory for persons publishing newspapers to give security for any damages which a court may award against them in a libel suit. It also provided for the correction of articles and other reports in local newspapers which contain factual statements which either are false or distorted.

The Port Ordinance (No. 15 of 1952), which amended and con- 505 solidated the law relating to the Port of Aden and matters ancillary thereto. It replaced the Indian Ports Act, 1908, and also the Indian Lighthouse Act, 1927.

The Port Trust (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 16 of 1952), which authorised the Trustees of the Port of Aden to raise money by way of loans or temporary borrowing in order to carry out the duties imposed upon them under the principal Ordinance. It also gave statutory recognition to the practice that all port dues, fees and charges should be credited to the Trustees.

The Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 17 464 of 1952), which brought within the scope of the principal Ordinance 465 locally engaged civilian staff of departments of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. In Aden this virtually means local civilians employed by Her Majesty's Forces.

It also increased the minimum payment of compensation, in the case of injury to a workman resulting in permanent total incapacity, from *Shs.*1,050 to *Shs.*1,500 and the maximum from *Shs.*15,000 to *Shs.*18,000 which latter amount represents 24 months' earnings of a workman whose monthly earnings do not exceed *Shs.*750.

This Ordinance has not yet been brought into force.

The Government Guards (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 18 of 1952), 703
which provided mainly for the better enforcement of discipline in the Force

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[For information as to the procedures and results of a tuberculin campaign by the United Nations World Health Organization and Children's Fund, see complete text.]

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themselves. Suzerainty over the small states of Arabia has changed frequently throughout history, and conflicting claims persist to this day. These claims are made even more troublesome by the fact that many of the desert borders of these countries have never been fully established, and are hardly more than theoretical lines on the map.

In spite of these manifold difficulties, Great Britain has succeeded in establishing and maintaining firm control over the southern and most of the eastern coastal region of the Peninsula, and in tying the various sheikhdoms and sultanates of that area fairly closely to the fabric of the Empire. On the basis of their legal relationship to Great Britain, the dependent states and territories in the Arabian Peninsula may be divided into three general categories: (a) British colonial territory (Aden Colony); (b) British protectorate (Aden Protectorate); and (c) semi-independent states under British protection (the Persian Gulf states).

THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF ADEN[1]

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The Colony. The city of Aden and the surrounding territory were occupied by a British force in 1839. Upon its annexation in the same year, Aden was made part of the Bombay Presidency and remained in this status until 1932 when it was constituted a separate province. The reorganization of the government of India in 1935 brought about a further change in Aden's administrative position, for Article 288 of the Government of India Act of that year separated Aden from India and envisaged its reorganization as a Crown Colony subordinated to the Colonial Office in London. A Royal Order in Council was issued on September 28, 1936, which introduced what may be termed a new constitution for Aden.[2]

This constitution follows the usual lines of the fundamental laws for British Crown Colonies whereby only the basic legislation

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[1] See in general Robert R. Robbins, "The Legal Status of Aden and the Aden Protectorate," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 33 (1939), pp. 700–15. On Aden and the Persian Gulf States, see Fritz Bleiber, "Die voelkerrechtliche Stellung der Staaten Arabiens," *Zeitschrift fuer oeffentliches Recht*, vol. 10 (1930), pp. 37–63.

[2] *Statutory Rules and Orders* (S. R. & O.), 1936, pp. 1–17.

14: Liebesny G-4 (no date) 1947

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Aden Colony MM1
Hadhramaut MM2

is enacted by the central authorities in London, day-to-day legislative needs being cared for by local legislation. The Crown, however, reserves for itself the right to legislate in all matters if it so desires. A conflict between imperial legislation and local legislation cannot arise because all local laws may be disallowed by the Crown. A 648 636

The Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and the Protectorate of[3] Aden is assisted in the exercise of his functions by a purely advisory Executive Council composed of high government officials. A Legislative Council, created by an Order in Council of November 23, 1944,[4] is composed of four ex officio members, four official members (i. e., persons employed by the Crown), and eight unofficial members (i. e. Aden residents, not employed by the Crown). The official as well as the unofficial members are appointed by the Governor. At the time the Legislative Council was set up, official British circles expressed the hope that at some future date it may contain elected unofficial members. A 636 H 642

The Council must give its consent to all legislation to be enacted for the Colony. Its members have the right to initiate legislation except in tax matters, and in matters which would involve the suspension of any or all of the Orders in Council enacted for Aden. The Governor presides over the Legislative Council and has an absolute veto over the measures it passes. The administrative direction of the affairs of the Colony is in the hands of a Civil Secretary responsible to the Governor. A 636

In spite of the transfer of administrative control over Aden from India and the India Office to the Colonial Office in 1937, the ties with India were not completely broken. A large amount of British Indian legislation which had been made applicable to Aden continued in force. The judicial organization, moreover, remained closely linked with India, since appeals from the Aden Supreme Court lay in the High Court in Bombay. In dealing with any legal case centered in Aden. British Indian substantive and procedural laws have, therefore, to be taken into account.

[3] All British colonial governors have the title Commander-in-Chief. This does not imply, however, any actual military command.

[4] S. R. & O., 1944 pp. 1 ff. The London Times, January 7, 1947, p. 3, reported the first meeting of this Council.

14: Liebesny G-4 (no date)1947 MI Middle East

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ADEN MM1

tion enacted for the Colony. Such legislation, however, applies only to persons who are not natives of the Protectorate. This point is of considerable practical importance. For example, the mining legislation for the Colony of Aden, which was extended to the Protectorate by the Governor in 1937, would apply to all foreign, including British, companies, but not to a native unless it had been made a part of the local legislation in the individual state in question. The situation with regard to the judicial organization is similar in that the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the Colony have jurisdiction in all matters arising in the Protectorate in which any person who is not a native is concerned.

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The relations of the British with the various native states in the Aden Protectorate are based on treaties concluded with the sultans and sheikhs in the course of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.[7] Treaty relations with neighboring sheikhs were established soon after the occupation of Aden in order to make the waters and roads around the port safe for peaceful traffic. Gradually British influence in the Aden hinterland was extended until in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth protectorate treaties were concluded with most of the more important local rulers. The important features of these agreements are the extension of British protection to the native state in question, and the promise of the local ruler not to enter into relations with any foreign government without British consent, or to dispose of any part of his territory in favor of a power other than Great Britain. Most of the sultans and sheikhs were granted stipends by the British; in case of noncompliance with the treaty provisions, discontinuance of the stipend was used as a weapon to force the rebellious sheikh into line.

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The protectorates thus established restrict the sovereignty of the local rulers to a very considerable degree. As far as international relations (including those with their immediate neighbors) are concerned, they are wholly unable to pursue an independent course. In internal affairs there exists a somewhat larger degree of autonomy, but British over-all control extends, in most cases,

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[7] The various treaties and agreements between Great Britain and the various rulers in the Arabian Peninsula are collected in India, Foreign and Political Department: *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, edited by C. U. Aitchison (Delhi, 1933), vol. 11. [Hereafter quoted as Aitchison.]

18: U. S. Dept. of State G-4 (no date) ca. 1946 MJl Saudi Arabia MJ1
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British interest in the Arabian Peninsula are controlled by three different central agencies in London: (1) Aden and the Aden Protectorate are administered by the Colonial Office; (2) The British officials in the Persian Gulf States belong to the Indian Political Service and as such are subordinate to the Government of India and the India Office; (3) the relations with the independant Arabian states, namely Saudi Arabia and Yemen, are regulated by the Foreign Office.

On the basis of their relationship with Great Britain the states and territories in the Arabian Peninsula may be divided into four general categories: (a) British colonial territory: Aden Colony; (b) British protectorate: Aden Protectorate; (c) semi-independent states under British protection: the Persian Gulf States; (d) independent states having treaties of friendship with Great Britain: Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

C. Aden

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1. The Colony. As mentioned above, the Colony of Aden was administered as part of India until 1 April 1937. It was part of the Bombay Presidency until 1932, when it became a separate province. The separation of Aden from India is based upon article 288 of the Government of India Act of 1935. This article envisaged the administrative reorganization of Aden as a Crown Colony subordinated to the Colonial Office in London. Consequently, a Royal Order in Council was issued on 28 September 1936 which introduced what may be termed a new constitution of Aden. (1) It follows the usual lines of the fundamental laws for British Crown Colonies. (2)

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1. Statutory Rules and Orders (to be quoted in the following as S. R. & O), 1936, pp. 1-7. Under British law the King acting with the advice of the Privy Council has the absolute right to create a constitution for a conquered or ceded colonial possession; of, A. B. Keith, The Government of the British Empire, New York, 1936. pp. 15-16.

2. A Crown Colony in the convenient sense is one whose administration is subject to the control of the Crown as

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represented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies; cf. Keith, op. cit., p. 463 n. 1.

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Under the system of legislative decentralization which prevails in the British colonial Empire, only the basic legislation for a colony is enacted by the central authorities in London. The day-to-day legislative needs are cared for by local legislation. The Crown, however, reserves for itself the right to legislate in all matters if it so desires. A conflict between imperial legislation and local legislation cannot arise because all local laws may be disallowed by the Crown. In many colonies there exists a legislative council with general legislative powers. The Governor has the power in these cases to veto any legislation passed by the council. In other possessions no legislative council has been established and both legislative and executive powers are vested in the Governor. Aden belongs in this latter category. In the exercise of his functions the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and the Protectorate of Aden (3) is assisted by an Executive Council which consists of high government officials and is purely advisory. (4) It has to be consulted by the Governor except in unimportant and urgent matters and in cases where consultation would cause material prejudice to the public interest. The Governor may act against the advice of the Executive Council, but has to justify such action to the Colonial Office. The administrative direction of the affairs of the Colony is in the hands of the Civil Secretary who is responsible to the Governor.

The city of Aden together with the peninsula of

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3. All colonial governors have the title of Commander-in-Chief, which does not imply, however, any actual military command.

4. Executive Councils have been established in all British colonies.

18: U. S. Dept. of State G-4 (no date) ca. 1946 MJ1 Saudi Arabia

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A The city of Aden together with the peninsula of Little Aden, the territory of Sheikh Othman, and the Island of 101 Perim thus form a Crown Colony under direct British rule. (5)

A 6421 648 5. The British distinguish between two basic types of colonial administration: direct rule and indirect rule. The former means that the area is administered directly by British colonial officials without any native governmental machinery as is the case in Aden Colony. In the latter case use is made of existing native institutions and many of the actual administrative functions are in the hands of native governments under the control of British colonial officials.

A [101] The islands of Kuria Muria, and Kamaran are also British possessions administered under the control of the Governor of Aden.

This means that no native government whatsoever functions in the area. As a colony, Aden is part of the British national territory and its inhabitants are British subjects. In spite of the transfer of administrative control over Aden to the Colonial Office, the ties with India have not been completely broken. A large amount of British A 692 671 Indian legislation, which had been made applicable to Aden, continues in force. The judicial organization, moreover, is still closely linked with India since appeals from the Aden Supreme Court lie in the High Court in Bombay. In dealing with any legal case centered in Aden, British Indian substantive and procedural laws have, therefore, to be taken into account.

H 642 648 2. The Aden Protectorate. The present organization of the Protectorate is based upon the Aden Protectorate Order in Council of 18 March 1937. (6) Under it the Governor of the Colony is at the

6. S. R. & O. 1937, pp. 750-57; amended 10 July 1940, S. R. & O. 1940, pp. 397-98.

same time Governor of the Protectorate. (7) The functions exercised

H 600 7. A protectorate, even one very closely resembling a colony, is not part of the national territory of the protecting state but

62:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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Aden Colony and Protectorate

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Aden Colony and the tribal states comprising the Aden Protectorate have a long and varied history, but they have been under the influence of Great Britain for over a century. The Colony of Aden consists of two small peninsulas, located about 100 miles east of the straits of Bab el Mandeb, the short strip of connecting mainland, Perim Island at the entrance to the Red Sea, and the small offshore islands of Kuria Muria to the east. It became a British dependency in 1839, but remained under the jurisdiction of India until constituted a Crown Colony in 1937. Exclusive of the islands, the Colony has an area of about 75 square miles, 21 square miles of which comprise the peninsula of Aden proper. The historic settlement is located on a rocky promontory, 5 to 6 miles in width and 2 to 4 miles in length, which is connected with the mainland by a narrow isthmus. It is an

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

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ficiency are widespread. Pellagroid lesions of the skin are often encountered among the peoples of the Protectorate. In a survey of 518 Arab schoolboys in Aden township in 1949, no cases of overt deficiency were found, but enlargement of the liver, possibly suggestive of low protein intake, was revealed in 27 per cent.

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MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

A small outbreak of epidemic muscular rheumatism, classified as Bornholm disease, was reported from Aden in 1946. It involved 35 persons—34 British and 1 Arab.

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Hepatic cirrhosis is one of the most frequent conditions seen at the Civil Hospital. Local physicians have noted that most of the cases come from malarious regions where qat is widely used, but the underlying causes have not been investigated.

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Chewing the leaves of *Catha edulis*, or qat, is a general custom in Western Aden Protectorate. The leaf juices contain a stimulant, and habitual indulgence is said to produce loss of appetite, sleeplessness and a variety of more serious nervous disorders. Local observers believe that addiction to the drug contributes to the widespread undernutrition among the people.

SUMMARY

The Colony of Aden and the adjacent Protectorate, on the southern coast of Arabia, have been British dependencies for over a century. The population of the Colony, including the port of Aden, was enumerated at 80,516 in the census of 1946, and calculated at over 100,000 in 1950. The Protectorate territory comprises two administrative divisions—Western Aden Protectorate and Eastern Aden Protectorate, in which the estimated population for 1948 was about 350,000 and 300,000, respectively. The local governments are tribal and diverse in organization, ranging from sultanates to smaller autonomous units. The inhabitants of both the Colony and the Protectorate are predominantly Arabs and adherents of Islam.

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